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Executive Summary 
	
	
Multi-user	 microgrids	 (MUMs)	 are	 an	 emerging	 approach	 to	 electricity	 service	 that	 allows	
neighboring	customers	 to	obtain	greater	 resilience	 in	electricity	 service,	 from	a	set	of	 locally-
installed	 distributed	 energy	 resources	 (DERs)	 of	 their	 own	 choice	 (sometimes	 including	 solar	
energy	 and	 energy	 storage),	 through	 joint	 participation	 in	 a	 power	 production	 and	 delivery	
system	that	can	operate	independently	from	the	host	electric	utility.			
	
To	date,	there	are	relatively	few	MUMs	in	operation.		This	is	primarily	because	regulated	utility	
service	 from	 the	 electricity	 grid	 has	 historically	 been	 adequate	 and	 cost-effective	 for	 most	
customers	 –	 and	 it	 is	 highly	 likely	 that	 this	 will	 remain	 largely	 true,	 so	 that	MUMs	 will	 not	
become	 widespread	 anytime	 soon.	 	 However,	 with	 improving	 microgrid	 economics	 and	
increasing	customer	needs	for	resilience,	there	will	be	a	growing	number	of	situations	in	which	
MUMs	will	become	viable.	 	Even	today,	certain	sets	of	customers	find	the	benefits	offered	by	
MUMs	to	outweigh	the	additional	costs.	
	
Despite	 this,	 MUM	 activity	 has	 been	 extremely	 limited	 because	 of	 a	 number	 of	 significant	
barriers	associated	with	implementing	this	novel	business	model.		Exacerbating	this,	there	is	a	
dearth	of	comprehensive	study	on	these	barriers.		Consequently,	the	goal	of	this	research	is	to	
provide	a	first	investigation	into	the	barriers	to	MUM	development	and	some	early	hypotheses	
on	potential	remedies	that	would	facilitate	MUM	development	when	and	where	they	might	be	
a	good	solution	–	with	a	particular	focus	on	the	Northeastern	U.S.			
	
Based	 on	 review	 of	 publicly-available	 information	 augmented	 by	 targeted	 interviews	 with	
individuals	who	 have	 been	 active	 in	 the	MUM	arena,	 the	 research	 uncovered	 seven	 primary	
barriers	to	MUM	development:	
	
• Inability	to	Monetize	Resilience	(and	Other	Value	Streams)	
• Conflicts	with	Pre-Existing	Rights	Associated	with	Electricity	Delivery	
• Preferential	Rights	for	Utilities	to	Cross	Public	Rights-of-Way	
• Ambiguity	About	Viable	MUM	Ownership	Models	
• Utility	Assertion	of	Rights	Via	Legal	Action	
• Lack	of	Suitable	Risk-Mitigation	Structures		
• Insufficient	Leadership	to	Coalesce	Solutions	
	
Our	research	further	surfaced	the	following	actions	that	have	generally	been	helpful	to	date	in	
addressing	these	barriers	and	facilitating	development	of	MUMs:	
	 7	
• Utility	Ownership	or	Strong	Utility	Participation	in	MUMs	
• Creatively	Leveraging	Opportunities	to	Reduce	MUM	Costs	
• Tailoring	Business	Models	to	Situation-Specific	Needs	
• Phased	Development	to	Spread	Costs	Over	Time	
• Robust	Execution	Capability	and	Stakeholder	Collaboration	
Based	on	our	findings,	the	research	team	recommends	the	following	activities	by	stakeholders	
committed	to	advancing	MUM	viability:	
	
• Increasing	Awareness	and	Understanding	of	MUM-Specific	Issues	
• Strengthening	Regulations	and	Policies	to	Improve	MUM	Playing	Field	
• Standardizing	MUM	Design	and	Implementation	
• Creating	Viable	Mechanisms	Valuing	and	Monetizing	MUM	Services	
• Learning	from	MUM	Innovations	Elsewhere	
• Organizing	for	Greater	Impact	
The	report	concludes	with	some	suggestions	on	topical	areas	that	merit	additional	research	to	
improve	the	ability	to	successfully	develop	MUMs	where	they	can	create	significant	value	for	
customers. 
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Introduction and Context 
	
What is a Multi-User Microgrid? 
	
Multi-user	microgrids,	or	MUMs	for	short,	are	an	emerging	approach	in	the	energy	sector	that	
provides	 multiple	 energy	 consumers	 the	 ability	 to	 self-supply	 electricity	 during	 grid	 outages	
while	continuing	to	leverage	the	existing	power	grid	during	the	majority	of	time	when	the	grid	
is	operating	normally.			
	
For	most	customers	and	in	most	locations	where	the	electricity	grid	is	robust,	electricity	service	
offered	 through	 traditional	 distribution	 utilities	 operating	 as	 regulated	 natural	monopolies	 is	
fully	satisfactory	–	and	this	is	likely	to	remain	the	case	for	the	most	part.		However,	for	certain	
customers	and	locations,	the	benefits	of	adopting	a	MUM	to	augment	conventional	electricity	
service	may	outweigh	the	additional	costs.		Moreover,	this	trend	is	likely	to	increase	due	to:	
	
• Recent	 advances	 in	 the	 performance	 and	 economics	 of	 distributed	 energy	 resource	
(DER)	technologies	such	as	solar	energy	and	energy	storage	
	
• Increasing	desire	 for	electricity	 customers	 to	make	 their	own	choices	about	electricity	
supply,	particularly	from	cleaner	sources	(e.g.,	solar)	than	available	from	the	grid	
	
• Growing	necessity	for	continuous	electricity	supply	in	a	digitized	world	in	the	face	of	a	
growing	 array	 of	 natural	 and	 human	 forces	 that	 threaten	 interruptions	 in	 grid-based	
electricity	service	
	
Referring	 to	 the	 last	 point,	 nonstop	 24/7/365	 access	 to	 electricity	 under	 any	 and	 all	
circumstances	 is	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 “resilient	 power”.	 	 The	 following	 four	 examples	
illustrate	acute	customer	needs	for	resilient	power:	
	
• A	 data	 center	 providing	 web	 and	 cloud-based	 services	 may	 be	 required	 to	 pay	
compensatory	damages	or	may	otherwise	 lose	business	 from	dissatisfied	 customers	 if	
operations	are	disrupted	by	a	loss	of	power	supply.	
	
• A	 fertility	 clinic	 that	 maintains	 patient	 eggs	 at	 a	 constant	 chilled	 temperature	 via	 an	
industrial	refrigeration	unit	may	face	significant	legal	risk	from	losing	power	for	even	a	
short	period	of	time.			
	
• Certain	healthcare	and	senior	citizen	resident	communities.	
	
• A	 municipality	 in	 a	 region	 prone	 to	 extreme	 weather	 events	 (such	 as	 hurricanes)	
becomes	 subjected	 to	 financial	 and	 social	 costs	when	 power	 is	 interrupted	 to	 critical	
community	facilities	(such	as	emergency	response	services).	
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For	customers	like	these,	an	increasingly	commonplace	method	to	obtain	resilient	power	is	to	
implement	a	microgrid.			
	
Although	several	alternative	definitions	 for	a	microgrid	have	been	put	 forward,	 the	definition	
established	by	the	U.S.	Department	of	Energy	(DOE)	is	one	of	the	most	frequently	cited,	and	is	
suitable	for	the	purposes	of	this	report:			
	
“A	group	of	interconnected	loads	and	distributed	energy	resources	
within	 clearly	 defined	 electrical	 boundaries	 that	 acts	 as	 a	 single	
controllable	 entity	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 grid.	 A	 microgrid	 can	
connect	 and	 disconnect	 from	 the	 grid	 to	 enable	 it	 to	 operate	 in	
both	grid-connected	or	island-mode”.i	
	
An	illustration	of	a	generic	microgrid	fitting	DOE’s	definition	is	presented	below.			
	
	
Source:		“Microgrids	Management”	by	Katiraei,	Iravani,	Hatziargyriou	and	Dimeas,	IEEE,	2008	
	
A	critical	concept	within	DOE’s	definition,	the	term	“island-mode”	means	that	the	microgrid	can	
sustain	electricity	service	for	its	customers	when	the	larger	grid	(sometimes	referred	to	in	this	
report	 as	 the	 “macrogrid”)	 is	 experiencing	 an	 outage.	 	 The	 microgrid	 is	 able	 to	 preserve	
electricity	service	by	disconnecting	as	necessary	 from	the	macrogrid,	at	 the	point	of	common	
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coupling	 (PCC)	 where	 the	 microgrid	 normally	 interfaces	 with	 the	 macrogrid	 at	 one	 of	 its	
substations,	and	becoming	an	independent	network	under	its	own	control.		For	a	microgrid	to	
have	 the	 capability	 of	 islanded-operation,	 its	 network	 must	 have	 a	 controllable	 set	 of	
distributed	 energy	 resources	 (DERs)	 –	 including	 a	 portfolio	 of	 distributed	 generation	 (DG)	
devices,	 probably	 of	 multiple	 types	 (e.g.,	 solar,	 wind,	 CHP),	 and	 most	 likely	 also	 distributed	
storage	 (DS)	equipment	–	 to	continue	supplying	electricity	 to	 its	customers	without	accessing	
the	macrogrid.	
	
While	microgrid	activity	has	been	increasing	in	recent	years,	most	microgrids	to	date	have	been	
implemented	 for	 a	 single	 customer.	 	 However,	 many	 situations	 exist	 in	 which	 multiple	
electricity	customers	could	benefit	from	jointly	participating	in	a	common	multi-user	microgrid	
(MUM),	 provided	 that	 they	 are	 in	 reasonable	 proximity	 to	 each	 other	 and	 generally	 share	
needs/preferences	in	regards	to	resilient	power	and	preferred	sources	of	electricity	generation.		
	
For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 research,	 a	 MUM	 must	 fit	 the	 DOE’s	 description	 of	 a	 microgrid	 –	
specifically	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 ability	 to	 island	 –	 while	 also	 serving	 multiple	 decision-making	
entities,	with	each	customer	paying	separately	for	the	microgrid	services.		Because	they	do	not	
provide	islanding	capability,	“virtual	microgrids”	were	not	considered	MUMs.		
	
To	 be	 considered	 a	 MUM	 for	 this	 report,	 the	 microgrid	 does	 not	 need	 to	 serve	 multiple	
buildings	or	facilities,	as	long	as	different	tenants	within	a	single	building/facility	purchase	the	
microgrid’s	services	separately.		In	contrast,	microgrids	which	serve	multiple	facilities	owned	by	
a	 common	party	 (such	 as	 a	municipality	 or	 university)	were	not	 considered	 as	MUMs	 in	 this	
research.			
	
The	schematic	below	provides	an	illustration	of	different	types	of	microgrids.		The	pink-shaded	
box	 in	 the	 lower	 right	 corner	 labelled	 “Utility	 and	 Community	Microgrids”	 characterizes	 the	
MUMs	that	are	discussed	in	this	report.	
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Why Study MUMs? 
	
While	the	microgrid	market	is	still	nascent,	it	has	been	and	is	expected	to	continue	growing	at	a	
healthy	rate,	as	 indicated	in	the	chart	below.	 	However,	as	the	chart	also	 illustrates	–	 in	gray,	
green	and	orange	–	single-user	microgrids	dominate	the	current	microgrid	universe.	
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Single-user	 microgrids	 represent	 the	 majority	 of	 current	 microgrid	 activity	 because	 it	 is	
relatively	easy	for	electricity	customers,	electric	utilities,	and	vendors	to	commercially	structure	
a	 single-user	microgrid.	 	A	 single	 customer	 can	 implement	an	 “islandable”	microgrid	on	 their	
own,	 requiring	 no	 coordination	with	 other	 stakeholders	 nor	 any	 changes	 to	 any	 pre-existing	
regulatory	structures	governing	electric	utility	service.		The	economics	of	single-user	microgrids	
are	 straightforward	 to	 evaluate	 and	monetarily	 structure,	 because	 the	 single	 entity	 incurs	 all	
the	costs	of	microgrid	development,	operations	and	maintenance	–	and	gains	all	of	the	benefits	
that	the	microgrid	affords.	
	
Since	 the	 majority	 of	 real-world	 microgrid	 experience	 has	 been	 with	 single-user	 microgrids,	
nearly	all	of	the	growing	body	of	literature	on	the	general	topic	of	microgrids	focuses	primarily	
(if	not	exclusively)	on	single-user	microgrids.					
	
Meanwhile,	 relatively	 little	 exploration	 has	 been	 undertaken	 into	 the	 issues	 inhibiting	 the	
development	 of	 MUMs.	 	 This	 deficit	 is	 concerning,	 because	 the	 future	 direction	 of	 the	
electricity	 industry	–	towards	greater	utilization	of	customer-sited	DER	assets,	often	based	on	
intermittently-available	 renewable	 energy	 augmented	 with	 energy	 storage	 –	 suggests	 that	 a	
growing	number	of	MUM	opportunities	will	become	of	interest	to	businesses,	institutions	and	
other	facilities	within	a	geographically-compact	area.		This	is	especially	true	as	DER	costs	–	and	
thus	the	cost	of	MUMs	–	continue	to	decline	as	the	industry	further	matures.	
	
To	begin	 filling	 this	gap	 in	knowledge,	 this	 study	 is	an	effort	 to	examine	 the	particular	 issues	
facing	MUMs	 to	better	understand	 the	barriers	and	obstacles	 to	 their	development	–	and	 to	
make	 recommendations	 to	 alleviate	 these	 challenges	 to	 facilitate	 future	 development	 of	
otherwise	attractive	MUM	opportunities.		
	
This	report	does	not	consider	the	potential	for	cost	reductions	in	equipment	and	services	that	
could	improve	the	ability	to	develop	MUMs.		Obviously,	MUMs	will	become	more	economically	
viable	 and	 easier	 to	 implement	 in	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 circumstances	 if	 and	 as	 they	 can	 be	
developed	and	operated	at	lower	cost.	 	Likewise,	certain	technical	 issues,	such	as	maintaining	
power	 quality	 at	 sufficiently	 high	 levels	 through	 the	 transition	 to	 islanded	 operation,	 may	
inhibit	 MUM	 development.	 	 Vendors	 and	 other	 parties	 supporting	 the	 microgrid	 industry	 –	
particularly	 those	 engaged	 in	 DER-related	 technologies	 –	 are	 already	 intensively	 active	 in	
pursuing	 cost	 reductions	 and	 technical	 improvements,	 and	 this	 report	 is	 not	 positioned	 to	
contribute	any	incremental	value	to	such	efforts.	
	
Since	the	opportunity	for	MUMs	to	create	value	for	a	growing	number	of	customers	should	only	
increase	 as	 DER	 economics	 continue	 to	 improve,	 research	 should	 be	 conducted	 to	 alleviate	
other	obstacles	to	successful	MUM	implementation	beyond	costs	that	are	currently	too	high.			
	
Such	non-cost	obstacles	to	successful	MUM	development	are	numerous	and	significant.			
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Because	multiple	parties	with	differing	objectives	are	 stakeholders	 to	MUM	development,	 all	
aspects	of	planning,	managing,	and	monetizing	 these	systems	 involve	 reaching	agreement	on	
various	complex	and	nuanced	matters.		Multi-user	microgrids	open	questions	of:		
	
• What	services	that	companies	developing	and/or	owning	microgrids	 --	companies	that	
are	not	regulated	utilities	--	are	allowed	to	sell	to	other	parties,	and	
• How	the	microgrid	 interfaces	both	operationally	and	commercially	with	respect	to	the	
utility	owning	the	distribution	grid	in	the	area		
			
This	report	investigates	these	issues	in	greater	detail,	by	assessing	commonalities	across	a	set	of	
case	studies	of	microgrids	developed	in	the	United	States,	with	a	particular	focus	on	the	
Northeastern	U.S.	
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Project Description 
	
Research Objectives 
	
In	 order	 to	 address	 the	 substantial	 gap	 in	 research	 focused	 on	 multi-user	 microgrids,	 the	
Northeast	Clean	Energy	Council	(NECEC)	and	the	Institute	of	Sustainable	Energy	(ISE)	at	Boston	
University	(BU)	collaborated	on	this	research	project,	with	two	primary	objectives:	
	
• Identify	barriers	to	the	development	of	otherwise	economically-attractive	MUMs	
• Make	specific,	actionable	recommendations	to	reduce/eliminate	these	barriers		
	
As	 noted	 previously,	 this	 research	 specifically	 considers	 MUMs	 (rather	 than	 single-user	
microgrids)	 because	many	 serious	 impediments	 to	microgrid	 adoption	 arise	 once	more	 than	
one	electricity	customer	is	served	by	a	microgrid.	If	the	barriers	that	prevent	the	development	
of	 MUMs	 can	 be	 reduced	 or	 eliminated,	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 stakeholders	 (private	 individuals,	
utilities,	 businesses,	 etc.)	 stand	 to	benefit	 from	 the	 internalization	of	 various	 social	 surpluses	
that	MUMs	can	produce.		To	varying	degrees	for	different	MUMs,	these	surpluses	may	include	
(but	are	not	 limited	 to)	 resilience	benefits,	 lower	overall	 costs	of	electricity	 service	provision,	
and	reduced	environmental	(primarily	greenhouse	gas	emissions)	footprint.	
	
This	research	was	sponsored	so	that	stakeholders	interested	in	the	advancement	of	MUMs	can	
take	 actions	 that	 improve	 the	 ability	 to	develop	 commercially	 successful	MUMs.	 	 This	 report	
aims	to	accomplish	this	goal	by:	
	
• Identifying	common	barriers	to	the	successful	development	of	MUMs	
• Exploring	the	characteristics	of	successful	MUMs	and	the	situational	attributes	that	lend	
themselves	 to	 successful	 MUM	 development,	 and	 articulating	 strategies	 that	 key	
stakeholders	have	pursued	or	could	pursue	to	reduce	or	eliminate	barriers	
• Providing	 insights	 that	 will	 improve	 regulation	 and	 policy	 surrounding	 multi-user	
microgrids		
Study Methodology 
	
The	initial	phase	of	research	in	this	project	involved	compiling	information	on	microgrids	in	the	
Northeastern	United	States.		This	was	conducted	by	performing	a	literature	review,	augmented	
by	interviews	with	parties	highly	knowledgeable	about	regional	microgrid	activity.		
	
Resulting	from	this	initial	information-gathering	phase	of	effort,	a	total	of	161	microgrids	were	
catalogued	into	a	dataset.		The	dataset	was	structured	to	include	notable	characteristics	about	
the	microgrid,	including	such	elements	as:	
	
• Location	
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• Size	
• Customer	profile	
• Host	utility	
	
From	 both	 the	 dataset	 and	 the	 perspectives	 gained	 from	 the	 interviewed	 experts,	 the	
researchers	further	investigated	a	smaller	set	of	microgrids	that	had	the	potential	of	being	truly	
multi-user	 in	 nature,	 and	 upon	 confirming	 that	 they	were	MUMs	of	 interest	 to	 the	 research	
team,	 sought	 to	 identify	 individuals	 that	 were	 both	 (1)	 deeply	 knowledgeable	 about	 the	
microgrid	and	(2)	willing	to	share	their	perspectives	with	the	researchers.			
	
Based	on	this	screening	process,	five	microgrids	were	chosen	to	study	in-depth	as	case	studies:	
	
1) BG&E	Microgrids	(Baltimore	and	Columbia,	MD)	-	Failed	proposal	
2) Bronzeville	Microgrid	(Chicago,	IL)	–	Under	Development	
3) Burrstone	Energy	Center	(Utica,	NY)	–	Operational	
4) Philadelphia	Navy	Yard	(Philadelphia,	PA)	-	Operational	
5) Potsdam	Community	Microgrid	(Potsdam,	NY)	-	Planning	phase	
	
The	team	strived	to	select	more	MUMs	from	the	states	of	New	England,	but	suitable	examples	
did	not	reveal	themselves.			
	
Even	 so,	 the	 resulting	 set	 of	 five	 MUMs	 reflects	 a	 considerable	 degree	 of	 diversity	 among	
various	 segmentation	 factors	 (state,	utility	 territory,	project	 type,	 status,	 as	well	 as	 customer	
base,	 density,	 and	 motivation).	 	 This	 breadth	 was	 deliberately	 sought	 so	 that	 any	 common	
findings	 from	across	 the	case	 studies	would	more	 likely	 indicate	 insights	widely	applicable	 to	
the	possible	universe	of	future	MUMs.			
	
Once	the	five	MUM	case	studies	were	selected,	a	thorough	literature	review	was	completed	on	
each	 microgrid	 in	 order	 to	 bolster	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 project	 characteristics	 and	 the	
history	of	its	development	before	conducting	follow-up	interviews	with	individuals	involved	in	
these	microgrids	 in	 some	 important	 capacity	–	either	 as	project	developer,	 engineer,	or	host	
utility.	 	 	 Interviews	provided	 insight	 into	the	challenges	that	arose	during	the	development	of	
these	particular	MUMs,	and	how	they	were	addressed.	In	certain	cases,	challenges	could	not	be	
completely	overcome	and	either	significantly	altered	the	final	microgrid	configuration	(such	as	
its	generation	mix	or	ability	to	connect	to	the	macrogrid)	or	caused	the	microgrid	project	to	be	
abandoned.		
	
After	completing	interviews	and	literature	review,	short	reports	were	developed	for	each	of	the	
five	MUM	 case	 studies	 to	 summarize	 key	 takeaways.	When	 compared	 to	 each	 other,	 these	
summaries	 surfaced	 hypotheses	 on	 common	 obstacles	 that	 arise	 during	 the	 development	 of	
MUMs.		Finally,	these	hypotheses	were	shared	with	a	select	group	of	external	reviewers	–	first	
in	a	workshop,	and	then	in	textual	form	–	to	produce	the	findings	presented	below.	 	
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Key Findings 
	
What are the main barriers to successful MUM development? 
	
Excluding	high	costs	as	an	inhibiting	factor	(for	reasons	described	above),	our	research	suggests	
that	 the	 following	 seven	 factors	 are	 significant	 and	 pervasive	 barriers	 to	 successful	 MUM	
development:	
	
Inability to Monetize Resilience (and Other Value Streams) 
	
One	 of	 the	 most	 common	 challenges	 facing	 potential	 developers	 of	 MUMs	 is	 the	 simple	
inability	to	produce	sufficient	economic	value	for	stakeholders	relative	to	the	cost	of	installing	
and	operating	a	MUM.		In	this	case,	the	net	present	value	(NPV)	for	the	MUM	will	be	negative,	
and	the	developer	will	not	be	able	to	attract	the	financing	needed	to	move	forward.		
	
There	are	a	variety	of	reasons	that	a	prospective	MUM	fails	to	generate	a	positive	NPV.		MUM	
costs	 are	 non-trivial,	 and	 while	 they	 are	 falling	 with	 technological	 advancement,	 increasing	
standardization	and	greater	efficiencies	of	vendors/suppliers,	the	costs	of	MUMs	will	never	be	
negligible.		Even	when	the	cost	structure	for	MUMs	is	much	lower	than	it	is	today,	there	will	be	
many	cases	 in	which	the	economic	benefits	to	prospective	customers	of	a	MUM	simply	don’t	
outweigh	the	costs.		
	
However,	 even	 with	 today’s	 economics,	 MUMs	 in	 certain	 circumstances	 might	 be	 able	 to	
theoretically	generate	economic	value	 in	excess	of	costs	–	but	the	developer,	 investor	and/or	
owner	of	the	microgrid	is	unable	to	capture	that	economic	surplus	through	a	pricing	mechanism	
or	revenue	stream.	
	
The	inability	to	capture	these	potential	revenue	streams	usually	derives	from	a	lack	of	market	
structures	to	create	price	signals,	or	from	the	failure	of	at	least	one	of	the	key	stakeholders	(the	
developer,	the	investor/owner,	and/or	the	involved	utility)	to	fully	recognize	the	value	some	of	
the	benefits	offered	by	the	MUM.				
	
The	most	vivid	illustration	of	this	phenomenon	is	resilience.			
	
Although	 it	 is	 commonly	 accepted	 that	 “everyone	 values	 resilience”,	 there	 is	 no	widespread	
agreement	 on	 how	 to	 actually	 measure	 resilience,	 how	 much	 customers	 value	 resilience	
beyond	 levels	 generally	 offered	 by	 the	 macrogrid	 (i.e.,	 current	 service	 quality	 is	 “taken	 for	
granted”),	whether	to	require	more	resilience,	and	finally	(and	crucially)	how	to	value	and	price	
resilience.			
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Without	an	ability	 to	 transact	on	 resilience,	one	of	 the	major	 sources	of	value	of	a	microgrid	
cannot	be	captured	in	a	revenue	stream	that	can	help	finance	its	installation.		(Please	see	box	
“How	is	Resilience	Valued?”	for	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	this	important	topic.)	
	
While	 resilience	 is	 the	most	obvious	 and	 important	 value	 stream	 that	 is	 currently	 difficult	 or	
impossible	for	MUMs	to	capture	and	monetize,	others	may	include:	
	
• Capacity	and	energy	value	and	ancillary	services	in	regional	wholesale	markets	
• Alleviation	 of	 local	 network	 constraints	 and/or	 deferment	 of	 need	 for	 distribution	
upgrades	
• Thermal	 energy	 opportunities	 associated	 with	 combined	 heat	 and	 power	 (e.g.,	 heat,	
cooling	or	steam)	
• Improved	 economics	 associated	with	 other	 non-energy	 infrastructure	 changes	 caused	
by	MUM	implementation	(e.g.,	building	improvements,	water	system	efficiency	gains)		
	
How is Resilience Valued? 
Microgrids	usually	cost	millions	of	dollars	to	design,	develop	and	construct.		Justifying	such	a	
substantial	 capital	 investment	has	become	a	common	hurdle	 to	microgrid	 implementation.	
Enhanced	 electrical	 service	 reliability	 and	 resilience	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 value	
propositions	for	a	microgrid,	as	they	can	maintain	electrical	service	in	the	event	of	larger	grid	
disruptions.		Alas,	this	value	has	been	difficult	to	quantify.	
	
Historic	estimates	of	the	value	of	resilience	have	ranged	from	roughly	$30	billion	to	upwards	
of	$150	billion	for	the	total	cost	of	lost	service	nationwide.ii	Estimating	the	monetary	value	of	
microgrid	 reliability	and	 resilience	can	be	challenging.	 	 For	 instance,	how	does	one	apply	a	
value	 to	 keeping	 a	 patient	 on	 life	 support?	 	Or,	 how	does	 one	 apply	 value	 to	maintaining	
years	 of	 cancer	 research?	 	 In	 these	 situations,	 the	 value	 of	 electricity	 service	 is	 essentially	
priceless.		
	
This	 is	 why	 entities	 like	 municipal	 emergency	 services	 (police,	 fire,	 emergency	 medical	
services),	 hospitals,	 universities,	 military	 facilities,	 and	 data	 centers	 are	 more	 frequently	
electing	to	adopt	microgrids	to	better	guarantee	resilience.		Institutions	like	these	recognize	
the	high	value	of	sustaining	electricity	service	(or	more	precisely,	the	high	cost	of	interrupted	
service).		
	
While	impact	of	service	interruptions	may	not	be	as	dire	for	private	sector	customers	as	it	is	
for	 institutional	 customers,	 appropriately	 estimating	 the	 value	 of	 electric	 reliability	 and	
resilience	for	industrial,	commercial	or	residential	consumers	remains	difficult	–	and	there	is	
no	consensus	on	the	appropriate	methodology	to	do	so.		
	
Entities	 like	National	Renewable	Energy	Laboratory	(NREL),	Lawrence	Berkeley	National	Lab	
(LBNL),	 and	 Electric	 Power	 Research	 Institute	 (EPRI)	 have	 accumulated	 extensive	 research	
investigating	methods	and	approaches	for	valuing	the	loss	of	electrical	service.iii		
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For	commercial	and	industrial	consumers,	a	common	approach	to	estimating	the	value	of	lost	
service	 involves	 a	 benefit-cost	 analysis	 (BCA).	 	 In	 a	 simple	manufacturing	 example,	 a	 BCA	
would	quantify	the	expected	value	of	 interrupted	production	due	to	interruption	of	electric	
service,	resulting	in	a	dollar	per	hour	value	specific	to	that	industrial	customer.		
	
Aggregated	to	the	national	level,	an	analysis	presented	by	LBNL	in	2017	estimated	that	power	
interruptions	 annually	 cost	 U.S.	 commercial	 customers	 $41	 billion	 (about	 $2300	 per	
customer)	and	U.S.	industrial	customers	at	$16	billion	(over	$19,000	per	customer).	
	
When	planning	a	microgrid,	the	estimated	cost	of	 lost	service	corresponds	directly	with	the	
value	of	added	resilience	and	reliability.	Electric	utilities	maintain	several	reliability	metrics,	
most	 prominently	 SAIDI	 (System	 Average	 Interruption	 Duration	 Index)	 and	 SAIFI	 (System	
Average	 Interruption	 Frequency	 Index).	 SAIDI	 and	 SAIFI	 are	 based	 on	 the	 power	 outages	
experienced	by	 the	average	 customer	annually	 in	 a	utility	 service	 territory,	 and	provide	an	
approximate	forecast	of	anticipated	outages	aggregated	to	the	utility	level.		
	
By	 estimating	 the	 cost	 of	 lost	 service	 for	 a	 customer	 using	 BCA	 (say	 $1M	 per	 hour)	 and	
knowing	the	anticipated	duration	and	frequency	of	outages	for	a	given	utility	(say	4.5	hours	
annually),	 one	 can	 roughly	 determine	 the	 added	 value	 of	 resilience	 and	 reliability	 for	 that	
system.	 	 For	 this	 example,	 if	 a	 microgrid	 could	 maintain	 service	 during	 those	 expected	
periods	of	outages,	on	average	the	consumer	would	save	$4.5	million	annually	–	though	the	
savings	 in	 any	 one	 particular	 year	 could	 be	 much	 less	 or	 greater,	 depending	 upon	 the	
frequency	and	duration	of	outages	that	actually	were	avoided.		
	
However,	this	basic	BCA	approach	has	several	downfalls.		
	
First,	 it	 is	 better	 suited	 for	 industrial	 and	 commercial	 consumers:	 	 it	 is	 straightforward	 to	
estimate	economic	consequences	to	a	for-profit	enterprise,	whereas	it	is	harder	to	assess	the	
cost	of	lost	service	to	residential	consumers,	for	whom	it	is	commonly	assumed	that	the	cost	
of	 lost	 service	 is	 relatively	 minimal.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 2017	 LBNL	 report	 indicated	 the	
approximate	 annual	 cost	 of	 lost	 service	 to	 residential	 customers	 was	 as	 low	 as	 $11	 per	
customer.iv	 	 However,	 these	 estimates	 do	 not	 consider	 the	 possibility	 of	 home-based	
businesses	or	the	true	out-of-pocket	losses	associated	with	an	outage	(e.g.,	food	spoilage).		
	
Secondly,	utility	reliability	and	resilience	metrics	can	be	biased	toward	shorter	term	outages,	
particularly	if	there	were	no	previous	extended	blackouts	in	an	area.	The	implementation	of	a	
microgrid	hedges	against	unexpected,	low-frequency	events	that	may	be	spread	periodically	
over	many	years.		
	
Lastly,	and	perhaps	most	importantly,	the	cost	benefit	analysis	method	does	not	incorporate	
market	connectivity.	Upstream	suppliers	and	downstream	vendors	are	affected	by	an	outage,	
even	 if	 they	 didn’t	 lose	 service	 themselves.	 These	 upstream	 and	 downstream	 costs	 are	
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typically	ignored	in	BCA.		
	
With	growing	digitization	of	 society,	 the	 increasing	need	 to	effectively	value	economic	and	
societal	 costs	 associated	 with	 lost	 electricity	 service	 has	 spurred	 additional	 studies	 in	 this	
arena.	 	 EPRI	 and	 the	 New	 York	 State	 Energy	 and	 Research	 and	 Development	 Authority	
(NYSERDA)	completed	research	on	the	subject	in	2017	and	2018,	respectively.v	These	studies	
evaluated	 the	 merits	 of	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 regional	 economic	 analysis,	 taking	 into	
consideration	overall	economic	activity	in	a	given	region.	Such	economic	studies	considered	
“industry-to-industry”	 transactions,	 where	 changes	 in	 productivity	 (due	 to	 loss	 of	 service)	
result	in	economic	trends	within	a	sector	such	as	changes	in	demand,	employment,	income,	
etc.	In	its	study,	NYSERDA	concluded	that,	in	a	single	day,	a	microgrid	could	mitigate	millions	
lost	in	the	regional	economy	while	providing	millions	in	societal	benefits.		
	
Regardless	 of	 the	 approach,	 estimating	 the	 cost	 of	 lost	 electricity	 service	 (or	 the	 value	 of	
resilience/	reliability)	 is	highly	variable	and	 lacks	a	standard	methodology.	 Inevitably,	 this	 is	
further	 complicated	 when	 there	 are	 multiple	 users	 who	 receive	 the	 reliability/	 resilience	
benefits,	 but	 who	 value	 those	 benefits	 differently.	 	 This	 factor	 represents	 an	 additional	
complexity	facing	MUM	development.	
	
Conflicts with Pre-Existing Rights Associated with Electricity Delivery 
	
The	 reason	 that	 most	 currently	 operational	 microgrids	 have	 been	 implemented	 for	 single	
customers	 is	simple:	 	today’s	regulatory	and	legal	structures	easily	suit	single-user	microgrids,	
but	don’t	accommodate	MUMs.			
	
A	single	user	microgrid	 is	a	natural	extension	of	the	commercial	relationship	in	which	a	single	
customer	 is	 served	 by	 a	 regulated	 utility	 via	 the	 macrogrid.	 	 A	 typical	 single-user	 microgrid	
involves	a	conventional	tariffed	service	agreement	between	the	utility	and	the	customer.	
	
In	contrast,	a	MUM	is	a	commercial	construct	that	is	not	contemplated	by	most	regulatory	and	
legal	 structures,	which	were	established	a	century	ago	under	 the	historic	 social	 compact	 that	
provides	electric	utilities	natural	monopolies	on	delivering	electricity	within	defined	territories.	
	
In	 a	 single-user	 microgrid,	 all	 electricity	 generated	 on	 the	 microgrid	 not	 consumed	 by	 the	
customer	is	sold	back	to	the	grid	–	either	to	the	distribution	utility	or	to	wholesale	markets.		The	
customer	continues	to	buy	electricity	from	the	grid	as	usual	to	meet	whatever	remaining	needs	
they	have:		there	is	no	purchasing	electricity	of	the	grid	in	bulk,	to	resell	to	multiple	customers.					
	
Now,	 consider	 the	 circumstances	 associated	 with	 a	MUM.	 	 Unless	 owned	 by	 the	monopoly	
utility	 itself,	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 MUM	 is	 effectively	 prohibited	 from	 delivering	 and/or	 selling	
electricity	to	the	various	customers	because,	within	a	utility’s	service	territory,	an	independent	
third-party	generally	cannot	deliver	electricity.			
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While	it	may	be	possible	for	the	MUM	owner	to	become	the	sole	buyer	of	electricity	–	and	then	
sell	 services	 defined	 in	 some	other	way	 to	 the	MUM	 customers	 –	 the	 non-electricity	 service	
introduces	 considerable	 complexity	 and/or	 risk	 to	 the	 commercial	 arrangement	 that	may	 be	
unattractive	to	the	MUM	and/or	the	customer.	
	
The	2016	rejection	by	the	Maryland	Public	Service	Commission	(MPSC)	of	MUMs	proposed	by	
the	 utility	 Baltimore	 Gas	 &	 Electric	 (BG&E)	 provides	 another	 illustration	 of	 how	 regulatory	
interpretation	of	electricity	delivery	rights	can	hinder	the	advancement	of	MUMs.vi		While	there	
were	several	other	reasons	underlying	 its	rejection,	the	MPSC	found	that	users	do	not	have	a	
choice	of	electricity	supplier	when	a	microgrid	is	operating	in	“island	mode”,	therefore	violating	
Maryland’s	Electric	Customer	Choice	and	Competitive	Act	that	provides	end	users	the	right	to	
choose	their	electricity	supplier.vii	 	Thus,	the	MPSC’s	2016	ruling	effectively	prevents	any	form	
of	“islandable”	microgrids.			
	
The	additional	complexity	and/or	risk	in	ensuring	legal	compliance	of	a	commercially	attractive	
and	 workable	 MUM	 is	 an	 additional	 burden	 that	 MUM	 development	 must	 bear	 if	 it	 is	 to	
succeed.	
	
Preferential Rights for Utilities to Cross Public Rights-of-Way 
	
In	 many	 jurisdictions,	 only	 regulated	 electric	 utilities	 are	 allowed	 to	 distribute	 and	 deliver	
electricity	with	wires	that	cross	a	public	 right-of-way	(ROW).	 	Even	where	this	 right	 is	neither	
absolute	 nor	 exclusive,	 exceptions	 to	 this	 generally	 accepted	 practice	 must	 be	 affirmatively	
obtained.	
	
Clearly,	 this	 issue	generally	restricts	MUMs	not	owned	by	utilities	to	only	serve	customers	on	
contiguous	parcels	of	private	property,	and	inhibits	including	other	nearby	customers	in	a	MUM	
that	would	otherwise	find	the	value	proposition	compelling.		Indeed,	as	more	users	of	a	MUM	
are	 contemplated	 in	 order	 to	 expand	 the	 pool	 of	 economic	 value	 that	 can	 be	 created,	 the	
likelihood	of	needing	to	cross	a	public	ROW	increases.	
	
The	 example	 of	 the	 Burrstone	 Energy	 Center,	 a	 multi-user	 microgrid	 in	 Utica	 NY,	 is	 highly	
instructive	on	this	issue.			
	
In	planning	the	Burrstone	microgrid,	Cogen	Power	Technologies	(CPT),	confronted	the	need	to	
cross	a	public	ROW	to	reach	a	prospective	customer,	Utica	College.			For	this	project,	CPT	should	
theoretically	have	faced	no	issues	in	crossing	the	public	ROW	–	but	in	fact	it	did.			
	
Independent	 legal	 analysisviii	 suggests	 that,	 in	 the	 state	 of	 New	 York,	 “municipalities	 are	
prohibited	by	statute	and	case	law	from	granting	their	own	exclusive	franchise	by	contract”	–	
although	municipalities	might	be	able	to	grant	an	exclusive	franchise	if	given	special	permission	
from	a	city	council.		Further	research	failed	to	reveal	any	evidence	indicating	that	the	Utica	city	
council	had	provided	any	exclusive	franchise	within	city	limits	to	National	Grid,	the	utility	that	
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provides	electricity	 service	 in	 the	Utica	area.	 	 Thus,	 at	 least	on	paper,	CPT	 should	have	been	
able	to	cross	the	public	ROW	in	its	Burrstone	microgrid	without	needing	to	secure	any	special	
approvals.	
	
Despite	 these	 facts,	 CPT	was	 nevertheless	 required	 to	 obtain	 a	 special	waiver	 from	 the	New	
York	Public	Service	Commission	to	cross	the	public	ROW	in	order	to	serve	Utica	College	at	 its	
Burrstone	microgrid.	 	 This	process	of	obtaining	 a	waiver	was	 time-consuming	and	expensive,	
requiring	CPT	to	hire	an	attorney	with	experience	in	handling	cases	involving	utilities	and	public	
service	law.		
	
Ambiguity About Viable MUM Ownership Models 
	
Projected	MUM	 economics	 and	 financial	 viability	 can	 depend	 significantly	 upon	 the	 optimal	
ownership	 structure	 for	 the	 microgrid	 –	 which	 in	 turn	 may	 not	 be	 compatible	 with	 current	
regulatory	and	legal	precedents.	
	
To	illustrate	how	this	might	occur,	note	that	certain	parties	may	be	able	to	monetize	selected	
value	 streams	 associated	 with	 a	 microgrid	 that	 other	 stakeholders	 –	 including	 the	 utility	
developer,	customers	or	investors	–	cannot.		Two	examples	of	this	phenomenon:	
	
• Tax	credits	associated	with	ownership	of	solar	assets	 in	a	microgrid	may	have	value	to	
only	 those	 stakeholders	 with	 a	 tax	 obligation	 that	 can	 take	 advantage	 of	 these	 tax	
credits	–	in	which	case,	it	might	be	essential	that	ownership	of	these	assets	be	allocated	
exclusively	to	those	stakeholders.	
	
• Some	stakeholders	in	a	MUM	may	be	prohibited	from	participating	(or	may	simply	not	
want	 to	 participate)	 in	 wholesale	 power	 markets	 offering	 potential	 revenue	 streams	
that	may	be	necessary	to	ensure	MUM	economic	viability.			
	
Consequently,	hybrid	ownership	 structures	may	be	of	 interest	or	possibly	even	necessary	 for	
some	MUMs.		However,	it	may	be	the	case	that	the	best	(or	perhaps	the	only	viable)	ownership	
structure	for	a	MUM	is	precluded	by	state	regulations.			
	
As	arguably	the	most	prominent	example	of	this	possibility,	certain	states	(including	New	York)	
do	not	 allow	 for	utility	ownership	of	 generation	assets.	 	 Yet,	 for	 some	MUMs	 (such	as	 those	
with	few	or	no	for-profit	stakeholders),	an	attractive	solution	may	entail	utility	ownership	of	the	
microgrid’s	generation	assets.		To	the	extent	that	this	is	the	case,	opportunities	for	viable	MUM	
development	may	be	thwarted.	
	
Utility Assertion of Rights Via Legal Action 
	
Relating	 to	 the	prior	 three	 issues	–	 rights	associated	with	electricity	delivery,	preferences	 for	
utilities	 to	cross	ROWs,	and	ambiguity	about	potential	MUM	ownership	 structures	–	multiple	
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leaders	 and	 experts	 in	 the	 microgrid	 industry	 expressed	 the	 concern	 that	 utilities	 have	
demonstrated	the	ability	to	effectively	assert	their	rights	via	legal	action,	thereby	causing	delays	
and	increasing	costs	and	risks	in	MUM	development.	
	
According	 to	 a	 2010	 NYSERDA	 reportix,	 “the	 mere	 threat	 of	 tying	 up	 a	 potentially	 small	
enterprise	 such	 as	 a	 microgrid,	 in	 litigation	 over	 franchise	 rights	 could	 stop	 a	 project”.		
Moreover,	the	report	also	states	that	it	 is	“likely	that	regulatory	authorities	will	be	inclined	to	
protect	 the	 incumbent	 distribution	 utility”	 and	 that	 “the	 utility	 itself	 is	 likely	 to	 defend	 its	
franchise	rights	in	court.”		
	
One	interviewee	described	the	case	of	a	private	developer	working	on	a	microgrid	that	had	to	
abandon	the	project	because	the	local	utility	wore	them	down	with	legal	litigation.			
	
Even	 the	 threat	 of	 potential	 legal	 action	 by	 utilities	 deters	MUM	market	 advancement,	 as	 it	
increases	risks	that	third-party	project	developers	may	be	unwilling	to	accept.		
	
Lack of Suitable Risk-Mitigation Structures  
	
The	 MUM	 market	 likely	 will	 struggle	 to	 approach	 its	 full	 potential	 until	 there	 is	 a	 greater	
availability	of	standardized	financial	instruments	–	specifically,	insurance	products	at	fair	prices	
–	that	mitigate	the	risk	of	an	investor’s	involvement	in	a	multi-user	microgrid.		
	
One	difficulty	 in	developing	a	 replicable	 financing	structure	 is	 that	 it	 is	 costly	 to	perform	due	
diligence	 on	 customer	 credit	 risk	 for	 a	 MUM,	 because	 unfortunately	 there	 are	 few	 if	 any	
economies	of	scale	to	credit	risk	assessment	as	more	users	participate	in	a	MUM.	
	
In	 addition,	 a	 MUM	 is	 subject	 to	 substantial	 financial	 risk	 if	 and	 as	 customers	 decide	 to	
discontinue	participation,	since	the	overall	economic	viability	of	the	MUM	is	likely	to	require	all	
parties	(and	especially	the	largest	customers)	to	remain	being	served	by	the	microgrid.		While	
“exit	penalties”	may	be	considered	to	mitigate	this	risk,	such	an	approach	is	likely	to	discourage	
certain	customers	from	joining	the	microgrid	in	the	first	place.			
	
Although	 increasing	 the	number	of	users	 in	 the	 customer	base	of	 a	MUM	might	dilute	 some	
risks	through	diversification,	it	also	increases	the	likelihood	of	at	least	one	customer	defaulting	
or	exiting.	
	
Unless	 and	 until	 financial	 structures	 are	 created	 to	 better	mitigate	 these	 risks	 –	 particularly	
when	 combined	 with	 the	 ambiguity	 about	 the	 ability	 to	 capture	 certain	 value	 streams,	
especially	 resilience	 –	 obtaining	 third-party	 investment	 in	MUMs	 is	 likely	 to	 remain	 a	major	
challenge.	
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Insufficient Leadership to Coalesce Solutions 
	
Before	 a	 multi-user	 microgrid	 starts	 taking	 shape,	 a	 well-positioned	 and	 knowledgeable	
individual	must	become	a	champion	–	identifying	the	opportunity	to	create	value	via	a	MUM,	
becoming	 convinced	 that	 it’s	worth	pursuing,	 and	 convincing	 the	 potential	MUM	owner	 of	 these	
values,	 notwithstanding	 the	 various	 barriers	 –	 to	 initiate	 action	 towards	 MUM	 creation.	 To	
effectively	lead	a	MUM	development	initiative	with	impact,	this	individual	will	almost	certainly	
need	to	be	associated	with	a	well-respected	organization	within	the	energy	sector.	
	
One	 obvious	 possible	 organizational	 home	 for	 an	 individual	who	 can	 perform	 this	 leadership	
function	 is	 the	 local	 electric	 utility,	which	 clearly	 has	 the	 requisite	 technical	 and	 engineering	
capabilities,	and	also	–	because	every	user	of	electricity	knows	the	identity	of	the	local	electric	
utility	–	possesses	pre-existing	relationships	with	the	customers	of	any	prospective	MUM.		
	
While	 some	 utilities	 have	 demonstrated	 the	 willingness	 to	 pursue	 a	 MUM	 with	 the	 aim	 of	
creating	 value	 for	 a	 set	 of	 customers	 –	 as	 evidenced	 by	 National	 Grid	 at	 Potsdam	 and	
Commonwealth	 Edison	 at	 Bronzeville	 –	 not	 all	 utilities	 have	 reached	 this	 degree	 of	
commitment.		Moreover,	even	those	utilities	that	have	participated	in	MUM	initiatives	have	yet	
to	 scale	 these	 activities	 into	 sizable	 initiatives,	 due	 either	 to	 insufficient	 strategic	 desire	 to	
achieve	 a	 commercial	 growth	 ambition	 or	 inadequate	 tactical	 capacity	 to	 focus	 on	 MUM	
possibilities	 in	 lieu	 of	 traditional	 utility	 projects.	 	 As	 a	 result,	many	MUM	opportunities	 that	
could	 be	 attractive	 to	 utilities	 are	 almost	 certainly	 not	 being	 led	 by	 utilities	 (or	 passionate	
individuals	within	utilities)	at	present.	
	
Absent	 decisive	 action	 by	 the	 utility,	 the	 individual	 and	 organizational	 leadership	 needed	 to	
make	progress	on	new	MUM	development	is	often	lacking.		In	addition	to	likely	capability	and	
information	deficits,	any	one	customer	on	a	prospective	MUM	is	poorly	positioned	to	serve	as	a	
project	 leader	 because	 this	 would	 create	 perceived	 inequality	 with	 the	 other	 potential	
customers.	 	 A	 consortium	 of	 customers	 can	 be	 created	 to	 become	 a	 MUM	 developer,	 but	
bringing	a	new	entity	into	existence	–	not	to	mention	capitalizing	it	and	recruiting	key	talent	–	is	
a	major	endeavor	that	often	calls	for	expertise	and	relationships	outside	of	the	core	capabilities	
of	the	customers.		
	
This	 gap	 can	be	 filled	by	alternative	 service	providers:	 	 organizations	other	 than	utilities	 that	
take	the	lead	in	MUM	development.		A	number	of	such	companies	are	already	positioning	for	
this	opportunity,	including:	
	
• Large	 multinational	 corporations,	 such	 as	 Engie,	 Schneider	 Electric,	 Shell,	 Enel,	 and	
Veolia	
• Power	project	developers	and	energy	efficiency	service	providers,	such	as	Anbaric	and	
Ameresco	
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Based	on	activities	they	have	already	taken	to	accumulate	expertise,	capabilities,	and	credibility	
in	developing	single-user	microgrids,	companies	such	as	these	have	a	head-start	in	positioning	
to	 become	 significant	 players	 in	 MUM	 development.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 providing	 competitive	
choices	 to	 potential	MUM	 customers,	 alternative	 service	 providers	 are	more	 likely	 than	 the	
local	utility	 in	becoming	distinctive	 specialists	 in	particular	 types	of	MUMs,	because	 they	 can	
gain	their	particular	expertise	and	market	it	anywhere	as	opposed	to	(at	least	primarily)	in	their	
own	service	territory.	
	
Although	only	a	few	exist	today,	developer-led	MUMs	are	beginning	to	appear.	One	of	the	most	
significant	 examples	 of	 a	multi-faceted	MUM	 is	 the	 Philadelphia	 Navy	 Yard	 (PNY)	microgrid,	
owned	by	 the	 Philadelphia	Authority	 for	 Industrial	Development	 (PAID)	 and	managed	by	 the	
Philadelphia	 Industrial	Development	Corporation	 (PIDC).	 	At	 PNY,	 a	multi-year	master	 energy	
planning	 and	 implementation	 project	 to	 redevelop	 a	 large	 urban	 parcel	 of	 land	 led	 to	 the	
creation	of	a	MUM	community.	 	The	resulting	microgrid	 is	one	of	 the	most	diverse	MUMs	 in	
North	 America,	 with	 approximately	 80	 electric	 customers,	 and	 PIDC	 virtually	 serves	 as	 the	
community’s	electric	utility.	 	Only	minimal	public	subsidies	were	necessary	 for	 the	viability	of	
the	PNY	MUM,	because	PIDC	was	able	to	earn	superior	returns	on	 its	 investments	relative	to	
the	 capital	 and	 operating	 costs	 of	 “business	 as	 usual”	 that	 would	 have	 been	 incurred	 if	
generation	supply	were	instead	purchased	from	the	local	utility.				
		
What actions have successfully addressed barriers to MUM 
development? 
	
While	not	all	MUMs	encounter	all	of	the	above	obstacles,	some	of	them	are	likely	to	pertain	in	
any	given	MUM	project	development.	
	
And	while	 there	 are	 no	 “silver	 bullet”	 solutions	 to	 these	 obstacles,	 certain	MUM	developers	
have	been	able	to	partially	if	not	fully	overcome	these	obstacles	in	MUM	development	activities	
to	date	through	tangible	actions.			
	
Utility Ownership or Strong Utility Participation in MUMs 
	
In	many	cases,	the	obstacles	listed	above	can	be	minimized	if	not	completely	eliminated	if	the	
MUM	is	developed,	owned	and	operated	by	the	local	monopoly	utility:	
	
• The	issues	associated	with	crossing	public	ROWs	and	authority	to	deliver	electricity	will	
be	mooted	if	a	MUM	is	owned	by	a	utility.	
	
• To	 the	 extent	 that	 assets	 from	 a	 utility-owned	 MUM	 can	 be	 rate-based,	 and	 the	
resulting	 MUM	 service	 is	 delivered	 via	 a	 regulated	 tariff	 that	 satisfies	 all	 parties,	
financing	 challenges	 will	 essentially	 be	 eliminated,	 and	 customer	 acquisition	 will	 be	
significantly	 eased	 –	 although	 such	 approaches	 will	 confer	 the	 utility	 a	 competitive	
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advantage	 over	 any	 other	 potential	 alternative	 service	 provider	 that	might	 otherwise	
consider	developing	a	MUM	for	these	customers.	
	
Not	 only	 does	 utility	 MUM	 ownership	 minimize	 some	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 challenges	 to	
MUM	development,	other	advantages	may	arise	as	well.	 	 For	 instance,	utilities	may	be	more	
inclined	 to	 increase	 the	 reliability	 and	 resilience	 of	 their	 own	macrogrids	 if	 they	 are	 able	 or	
encouraged	 to	participate	 in	MUM	development	 in	particularly	vulnerable	 locations.	 	Utilities	
may	 also	 be	 able	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 economies	 of	 scale	 (e.g.,	 in	 equipment	 procurement,	
engineering,	 and	 legal/permitting)	 to	 reduce	 MUM	 costs	 relative	 to	 what	 a	 smaller	 MUM	
developer	could	achieve.	
	
For	these	reasons,	utility-ownership	is	a	promising	enabler	of	MUM	advancement.		The	highly-
visible	 progress	 being	 made	 at	 the	 Bronzeville	 multi-user	 microgrid	 under	 development	 in	
Chicago	by	the	utility	Commonwealth	Edison	is	indicative	of	this	promise.	
	
None	of	 the	 above	 is	 to	 suggest	 that	 utilities	must	 or	 even	 should	 develop	 and	own	MUMs.		
Rather,	 it	 is	 merely	 an	 acknowledgement	 that	 utility-ownership	 greatly	 simplifies	 the	 MUM	
implementation	process.	
	
Even	 if	 the	utility	doesn’t	develop	or	own	the	MUM,	deep	 involvement	of	 the	utility	 in	some	
manner	(i.e.	operation,	billing,	customer	management,	financing,	engineering,	etc.)	is	often	an	
important	facilitator	of	successful	MUM	implementation.		This	is	because	utilities	usually	have	
great	 credibility	 and	 influence	 both	 with	 customers	 and	 regulators,	 who	will	 play	 significant	
roles	in	whether	or	not	a	proposed	MUM	will	be	completed:	
	
• Supportive	 participation	 of	 utilities	 in	 MUM	 planning	 will	 not	 only	 minimize	 any	
opposition	 that	 they	 might	 otherwise	 raise,	 but	 should	 streamline	 discussions	 with	
regulators	 and	 other	 governing	 bodies	 (e.g.,	 local	 permitting),	 thereby	 accelerating	
receipt	of	necessary	approvals	and	reducing	development	costs.			
	
• Utility	support	will	also	be	helpful	 in	securing	the	customers	to	a	multi-user	microgrid,	
who	 might	 otherwise	 harbor	 concerns	 about	 project	 viability	 or	 reliability	 of	 the	
resulting	service.			
	
• Utilities	 can	 also	 play	 a	 useful	 role	 in	 MUM	 engineering	 activities	 –	 especially	 in	
navigating	the	interconnection	process	at	minimum	cost	–	not	only	to	ensure	continued	
reliability	of	the	macrogrid,	but	also	to	validate	or	even	improve	reliability	of	the	MUM	
service.	
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Creatively Leveraging Opportunities to Reduce MUM Costs 
	
Microgrids	 are	 a	 relatively	 new	 approach	 for	 electricity	 service	 that	 encompass	 many	 still-
advancing	 technologies.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 while	 costs	 should	 decline	 over	 time	 with	 continued	
improvements,	microgrids	remain	somewhat	expensive	to	develop	today.		
	
Acknowledging	this	challenge,	successful	developers	are	creative	in	finding	ways	to	reduce	the	
net	costs	of	implementing	a	microgrid.		For	instance,	many	of	the	microgrids	we	identified	that	
have	completed	the	arduous	development	process	and	became	operational,	whether	single	or	
multi-user,	received	more	than	$1	million	from	various	state	or	federal	funding	programs.			
	
Another	common	aspect	of	a	successful	MUM	is	the	presence	of	pre-existing	infrastructure	that	
could	be	incorporated	into	the	MUM.	Similar	to	the	availability	of	grant	programs,	the	presence	
of	 existing	 infrastructure	 helps	 to	 alleviate	 capital	 costs	 of	 microgrids.	 Both	 the	 proposed	
Baltimore	 Gas	 &	 Electric	 (BG&E)	 MUMs	 and	 the	 operational	 Burrstone	 MUM	 represent	
examples	in	which	the	developers	took	advantage	of	preexisting	infrastructure.		
	
Tailoring Business Models to Situation-Specific Needs 
	
Conventional	electricity	service	via	the	macrogrid	exemplifies	the	concept	of	a	“one-size-fits-all”	
offering.		Prices,	terms	and	conditions,	and	other	service	attributes	(e.g.,	reliability,	quality)	are	
standardized	and	available	in	a	non-discriminatory	manner	to	any	and	all	customers	within	the	
defined	customer	class	in	a	regulated	monopoly	utility	service	territory.	
	
Microgrids	 inherently	 represent	 a	 break	 from	 that	 underlying	 philosophy.	 	 Microgrids	
intrinsically	offer	much	greater	 customization	of	 electricity	 service	delivery	 to	 customers.	 	As	
such,	microgrid	 developers	 fundamentally	must	 design	 and	 engineer	 a	 system	 of	 equipment	
and	infrastructure	to	meet	the	specific	needs	of	the	customers	to	be	served.	
	
If	the	physical	design	of	the	microgrid	is	configured	to	meet	the	specific	needs	of	its	customers,	
then	it	follows	that	the	commercial	design	of	the	microgrid	should	also	be	tailored	to	meet	the	
situational	circumstances.			
	
The	 commercial	 arrangements	 intrinsic	 to	 the	 Burrstone	microgrid	 provide	 an	 example	 of	 a	
developer	offering	a	creative	approach	that	reduces	energy	costs	for	participating	users	while	
ensuring	the	resilience	and	reliability	of	electricity	service	that	the	MUM’s	customers	require.		
	
The	 Burrstone	 microgrid	 owner	 Cogen	 Power	 Technologies	 (CPT)	 sells	 electricity	 from	 the	
microgrid	 to	 National	 Grid	 on	 the	 macrogrid	 via	 a	 Power	 Purchase	 Agreement	 (PPA)	 under	
which	 CPT	 is	 reimbursed	 at	 the	wholesale	 electricity	 price	 during	 the	 hour	 of	 the	 sale.	 	 CPT	
monitors	 the	 price	 to	 be	 received	 for	 exported	 power,	 total	 power	 consumption	 on	 the	
microgrid,	and	the	cost	of	running	the	microgrid’s	generators	for	an	hour.	It	then	considers	this	
data	and	simulates	50	scenarios	in	order	to	optimize	microgrid	operations	at	an	hourly	level.	
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To	 take	 this	 optimization	 to	 the	 next	 step,	 CPT	 is	 currently	 developing	 a	 pilot	 program	with	
National	 Grid	 that	 works	 almost	 like	 a	 supply-side	 version	 of	 demand	 response,	 in	 which	
National	 Grid	 will	 pay	 a	 premium	 on	 electricity	 exported	 by	 CPT	 during	 peak	 periods	 when	
pricing	 is	 high.	 National	 Grid	 will	 temporarily	 increase	 the	 price	 they	 pay	 for	 CPT	 exported	
electricity	 in	order	to	 incentivize	microgrid	customers	(including	a	hospital	and	nursing	home)	
to	temporarily	curtail	electricity	consumption	to	enable	increased	sales	of	electricity	to	the	grid.		
	
Phased Development to Spread Costs Over Time 
	
Because	 MUMs	 are	 capital-intensive,	 it	 may	 be	 preferable	 for	 both	 the	 developer	 and	 the	
customer	 base	 to	 implement	 the	 microgrid	 in	 phases,	 so	 as	 to	 spread	 the	 economic	 and	
financial	impacts	over	time.		
	
The	example	of	the	Potsdam	Community	Microgrid	is	illustrative	in	this	regard.			
	
Potsdam	is	a	remotely	located	town	in	upstate	New	York	subject	to	intense	storms	during	the	
winter	 that	 make	 it	 difficult	 for	 the	 utility	 (National	 Grid)	 to	 send	 a	 service	 truck	 to	 fix	
infrastructure.	To	make	matters	worse,	Potsdam	receives	power	via	long	transmission	lines	of	
aging	vintage	that	are	highly	susceptible	to	damage	from	extreme	weather.	 In	1998,	Potsdam	
faced	major	 consequences	of	 these	 vulnerabilities,	when	a	winter	 storm	 led	 to	a	 three-week	
power	outage.			
	
Since	Potsdam	community	leaders	do	not	want	to	face	such	a	circumstance	again,	National	Grid	
is	developing	plans	for	a	community	microgrid	to	support	a	range	of	critical	facilities	–	including	
a	hospital,	local	police	and	fire	departments,	water	treatment	plants,	and	Clarkson	University	–	
as	well	as	a	number	of	commercial	buildings.			
	
National	Grid	recognized	that	a	MUM	for	Potsdam	merits	serious	consideration	as	a	solution,	
because	 the	 aging	 electricity	 infrastructure	 to	 supply	 Potsdam	 requires	 significant	 ongoing	
repair	 and	 maintenance	 expenditures,	 and	 the	 cost	 of	 full	 replacement	 was	 deemed	
prohibitive.				
	
Alas,	for	other	reasons,	the	Potsdam	community	is	fiscally	stressed	and	finds	it	difficult	to	afford	
the	costs	of	the	community	microgrid,	even	though	the	payback	on	 investment	 is	 likely	to	be	
attractive.			
	
An	original	plan	prepared	by	National	Grid	for	the	Potsdam	microgrid,	involving	complete	build-
out	upon	commissioning,	was	determined	to	be	economically	infeasible	because	it	would	lead	
to	an	 increase	 in	electricity	prices	too	substantial	 for	the	economically-challenged	community	
to	absorb.	Consequently,	National	Grid	split	 the	project	 into	several	 stages,	 resulting	 in	more	
modest	 price	 increases	 at	 the	 completion	 of	 each	 stage.	 	 (Further	 detail	 on	 the	 staged	
development	of	the	Potsdam	microgrid	is	provided	in	Appendix	1.)	
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It	could	be	argued	that,	by	lengthening	the	MUM	development	process,	overall	projects	costs	
for	 the	 Potsdam	 microgrid	 may	 have	 increased	 somewhat.	 Likewise,	 by	 not	 immediately	
implementing	 the	MUM	 in	 its	 full	 vision,	 certain	 customers	 in	 Potsdam	will	 not	 immediately	
gain	access	to	resilient	energy	infrastructure,	and	will	thus	be	delayed	in	gaining	benefits	that	
only	will	materialize	when	the	MUM	is	complete.			
	
Nevertheless,	 it	appears	 that	 these	disadvantages	are	outweighed	by	 the	 fact	 that	 large	one-
time	economic	consequences	of	implementing	the	MUM	are	instead	spread	over	time.	
	
Robust Execution Capability and Stakeholder Collaboration 
	
Developing	 a	 MUM	 is	 inherently	 a	 significant	 business	 initiative.	 	 As	 such,	 successful	 MUM	
development	 requires	 the	 same	 suite	 of	 strong	 resources	 critical	 for	 any	 business	 success:		
especially	good	talent,	a	good	plan,	and	a	cooperative,	collaborative	team	of	stakeholders.	
	
Reflecting	 the	 discussion	 above,	 a	 project	 champion	 possessing	 both	 the	 passion	 and	 the	
requisite	 set	of	 technical,	 commercial	 and	 interpersonal	 capabilities	 is	 vital	 to	navigate	MUM	
development	through	the	numerous	and	substantial	barriers.		The	project	leader	will	also	need	
to	play	a	significant	leadership	role,	including	both:	
	
• Relying	upon	a	deep	cadre	of	supporting	staff,	including	outside	experts	in	engineering	
and	legal	disciplines	to	advance	the	project.			
• Nurturing	collaboration	among	representatives	spanning	the	multitude	and	diversity	of	
stakeholders	affected	by	a	MUM	project.	
	
A	skilled	project	leader	will	develop	and	coalese	support	among	the	diverse	stakeholder	team,	
such	that	all	members	are	collectively	engaged	and	advancing	the	project	 together.	 	 It	 is	also	
very	 important	 that	 all	 team	 members	 –	 both	 from	 the	 developer	 and	 from	 the	 various	
stakeholders	 –	maintain	 a	 positive	 and	 constructive	 attitude	 seeking	 to	 overcome	 challenges	
rather	than	exacerbate	them	with	the	goal	of	thwarting	progress.	
	
In	turn,	to	ensure	that	a	MUM	development	team	is	aligned	in	its	actions,	a	solid	business	plan	
is	also	valuable.		Multiple	interviewees	emphasized	the	importance	of	creating	a	solid	business	
plan,	because	it	serves	as	both	a	focusing	mechanism	and	communication	device	to:	
	
• Target	the	right	mix	of	customers	to	maximize	the	aggregate	economic	benefit		
• Coordinate	among	stakeholders	–	many	of	whom	with	divergent	perspectives	–	to	reach	
agreements	
• Clarify	 how	 the	 benefits	 of	 a	 microgrid	 will	 be	 monetized	 in	 order	 to	 recover	
development	and	operating	costs,	and	
• Ensure	that	customers	would	utilize	the	microgrid	over	a	sufficiently	long	period	of	time	
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As	with	any	venture,	important	components	of	a	strong	business	plan	for	a	MUM	include:		
	
• The	value	proposition	for	 identified	users,	especially	related	to	 loss	avoidance	through	
greater	resilience	of	energy	supply,	relative	to	the	status	quo	and	other	alternatives	
• Mechanisms	for	capturing	some	of	this	added	value	for	the	MUM	developer	
• Realistic	estimates	of	capital	investments,	operating	expenses,	and	revenue	projections	
• Identification	 and	 assessment	 of	 key	 relationships	 (e.g.	 with	 local	 utilities,	 potential	
customers)	
• Governance	in	decision-making	and	operational/financial	roles/responsibilities	
• How	growth	and	contingencies	(such	as	departures	of	key	customers)	will	be	handled	
• Assessment	of	primary	risks	
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Recommendations 
	
Stakeholder Actions 
	
The	advancement	of	multi-user	microgrids	will	 happen	only	hesitantly	 –	 and	 correspondingly	
the	benefits	they	could	offer	to	customers	and	society	will	remain	largely	unrealized	–	without	
targeted	 and	 sustaining	 actions	 by	 stakeholders	 who	 have	 crucial	 roles	 to	 play	 in	 MUM	
development.		
	
Our	research	suggests	the	following	thematic	initiatives	have	the	potential	of	creating	the	most	
positive	impact	to	advance	MUM	activity:	
	
Increasing	Awareness	and	Understanding	of	MUM-Specific	Issues:	
A	 critical	 first	 step	 to	 facilitating	 the	 development	 of	 MUMs	 is	 to	 increase	 the	 level	 of	
understanding	 across	 the	 full	 spectrum	 of	 parties	 involved	 in	 microgrids,	 including	 utilities,	
regulators,	developers,	investors,	and	customers.		
	
Because	the	entire	topic	of	microgrids	 is	new	and	consequently	evolving	rapidly,	and	because	
many	 of	 its	 aspects	 differ	 quite	 significantly	 from	 the	 conventional	 ways	 of	 thinking	 about	
electricity	service,	considerable	education	remains	necessary	to	ensure	that	stakeholders	even	
have	a	common	language	to	use	in	considering	issues	that	require	solutions.		This	is	especially	
the	case	for	the	subset	of	microgrids	that	are	truly	multi-user,	since	they	have	only	rarely	been	
developed	to	date	and	raise	a	number	of	unique	issues	highlighted	in	this	report.	
	
Developing	a	common	understanding	of	the	potential	value	of	MUMs	relative	to	other	energy	
services,	 and	 the	 circumstances	 under	 which	 MUMs	 are	 especially	 beneficial,	 will	 help	 to	
galvanize	 support	 for	MUM	development	 and	assuage	 fear	 and	uncertainty	 about	what	 such	
development	means	 for	 incumbent	 interests.	 All	 stakeholders	 need	 to	 understand	 the	 issues	
presented	in	this	research,	and	discuss	how	these	obstacles	can	best	be	overcome	in	ways	that	
benefit	all.	
	
Targeting	 an	 audience	 of	 state	 regulators,	 utilities,	 private	 developers,	 and	 experts	 on	
utility/franchise	law,	workshops	that	gather	stakeholders	involved	in	MUM	activities	should	be	
convened	to	discuss	best	practices	and	establishing	common	terminology	and	frameworks	for	
considering	issues	related	to	MUM	development.	
	
Because	of	the	importance	of	introducing	new	financial	structures	–	many	of	which	are	akin	to	
insurance	 products	 –	 to	 facilitate	 greater	 activity	 in	 the	MUM	marketplace,	 special	 attention	
should	 be	 paid	 to	 attracting	 and	 involving	 experts	 on	 pricing	 and	 design	 of	 services	 and	
solutions	that	provide	customers	power	resilience	under	contingent	circumstances.	
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Strengthening	Regulations	and	Policies	to	Improve	MUM	Playing	Field:	
As	 this	 report	 strives	 to	emphasize,	 improving	clarity	on	state	 laws	surrounding	 the	 franchise	
rights	of	utilities	and	several	other	regulatory	issues	will	be	essential	 in	eliminating	or	at	 least	
reducing	barriers	to	successful	MUM	development.		In	some	cases	and	ways,	greater	clarity	will	
not	be	enough:		regulations	and	policies	may	need	to	change.			
	
In	 particular,	 greater	 effort	 should	 be	 made	 to	 eliminate	 ambiguities	 stemming	 from	 the	
absence	 of	 microgrid	 law	 by	 pushing	 for	 codified	 standards	 pertaining	 to	 microgrids.	 	 As	
described	 in	 the	 sidebar	box	 “Policy	 Initiatives	 to	Advance	MUMs”,	Massachusetts	House	Bill	
4324	 and	 New	 Hampshire	 House	 Bill	 1338	 are	 strong	 examples	 of	 this.	 Bills	 such	 as	 these	
represent	the	type	of	policy	efforts	that	are	needed	to	establish	a	clearer	legal	framework	for	
microgrids.		
	
Ideally,	changes	to	these	laws	can	create	the	assurances	necessary	for	private	developers	(and	
their	 investors)	 to	 implement	multi-user	microgrids	while	 still	 protecting	utilities	 from	 loss	of	
revenue	and	customers	from	unfair	shifts	in	cost	allocation.	Once	states	create	legal	definitions	
for	MUMs	 and	 clarify	 the	 ownership	 models	 that	 are	 allowed,	 stakeholders	 can	 structure	 a	
feasible	MUM	with	much	 less	uncertainty,	avoid	costly	and	time	consuming	 legal	battles,	and	
assure	investors	that	their	planned	business	model	meets	regulatory	requirements.		
	
Even	better,	 if	 the	development	of	definitions	and	 regulation	 for	MUMs	comes	 from	a	 larger	
community	agreement,	many	of	the	rules	and	standards	may	become	commonplace	industry-
wide.	 Such	 clarity	 of	 rules	 and	 standards	 would	 allow	 for	 the	 development	 of	 more	
standardized	models	 for	MUMs	 that	 can	 be	 applied	 across	multiple	microgrids	 –	 and	 also	 in	
microgrids	in	different	states.	This	would	not	only	reduce	development	risks	about	what	will	be	
accepted,	but	would	also	lower	the	soft	costs	of	MUM	design	and	development.	
	
For	the	most	part,	under	current	regulatory	approaches,	utilities	are	able	to	earn	profits	only	on	
capital	expenditures	that	are	approved	to	be	included	in	rate	base.		To	the	extent	that	utilities	
might	be	 interested	 in	a	MUM	opportunity,	 this	 framework	creates	a	strong	 incentive	for	the	
utility	 in	 favor	of	asset	deployment,	effectively	ensuring	 that	 the	utility	would	seek	 to	be	 the	
owner	 of	 the	MUM	 –	 and	 indeed	might	 oppose	 the	MUM	 if	 utility	 ownership	 were	 not	 an	
option.		Therefore,	regulatory	innovations	to	allow	utilities	to	be	able	to	earn	profits	on	services	
provided	 (i.e.,	 engineering	 services	 to	 support	MUM	 implementation),	 rather	 than	 solely	 on	
capital	investments,	would	incentivize	utility	MUM	participation	even	if	utility	ownership	is	for	
some	reason	not	the	best	option.		
	
Policy Initiatives to Advance MUMs 
As	described	 in	this	report,	 there	are	many	aspects	of	state	 law	and	regulations	that	affect	
whether	 and	 how	MUM	development	 activity	 can	 occur.	 	 In	 turn,	 there	 is	 a	 great	 deal	 of	
variability	between	states	on	how	these	laws	and	regulations	are	written.		And,	in	most	cases,	
the	relevant	laws	and	regulations	were	written	long	before	MUMs	were	considered	plausible.		
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Reflecting	upon	 this	often	confusing	and/or	ambiguous	 situation,	and	 the	 interest	of	many	
parties	to	advance	MUMs,	early	initiatives	are	underway	to	reform	or	otherwise	clarify	laws	
and	 regulations	 in	 ways	 so	 as	 to	 improve	 the	 ability	 for	 MUM	 development	 to	 proceed	
efficiently.			
	
In	 the	 Northeast	 United	 States,	 the	 following	 pieces	 of	 legislation	 involving	 MUMs	 have	
recently	advanced:	
	
• Drafted	in	March	2018,	New	Hampshire	House	Bill	1338	“establishes	a	committee	to	
study	 the	 changes	 in	 law	 necessary	 to	 allow	 for	 microgrids	 in	 electricity	 supply”.x	
While	 the	 bill	 did	 not	 come	 to	 fruition,	 it	 demonstrates	 the	 type	 of	 state-level	
initiative	that	provides	greater	regulatory	clarity	regarding	microgrids.		
	
• Earlier	 in	2018,	 the	Maine	 legislature	 (both	 the	House	and	the	Senate)	passed	a	bill	
(H.P.	190/L.D.	257)	allowing	for	petitions	to	construct	microgrids	that	serve	the	public	
interest.		However,	the	bill	was	vetoed	by	Governor	LePage	in	April	2018.		
	
• In	 Massachusetts,	 House	 Bill	 4324	 was	 drafted	 to	 enable	 the	 Economic	 &	
Development	Corporation	of	Boston	to	choose	a	“a	single	energy	service	company	for	
the	 design,	 construction,	 operation,	 maintenance,	 and	 financing	 of	 a	 district	
energy/microgrid	 project	 and	 related	 energy	 savings	 performance	 contract	 to	 serve	
the	public	and	private	property	owners	and	tenants	in	the	Raymond	L.	Flynn	Marine	
Park.”		
	
The	 contrast	 between	 these	 bills	 is	 particularly	 noteworthy:	 	 Maine	 HP190/LD257	 and	
Massachusetts	 HB	 4324	 work	 towards	 the	 legalization	 of	 either	 a	 specific	 microgrid	 or	
microgrids	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis,	 whereas	 the	 New	 Hampshire	 bill	 is	 more	 generalized,	
providing	a	legal	framework	for	microgrid	development	in	the	state.	
	
Another	powerful	policy	approach	to	promote	MUMs	has	been	implemented	by	the	Boston	
Planning	 and	 Development	 Agencyxi	 (BDPA),	 which	 now	 requires	 all	 new	 real	 estate	
developments	in	the	Boston	area	over	1.5	million	square	feet	to	conduct	a	feasibility	study	of	
a	microgrid.			
	
	
Standardizing	MUM	Design	and	Implementation:	
While	 microgrids	 inherently	 represent	 a	 departure	 from	 “one-size-fits-all”	 electricity	 service	
from	the	regulated	monopoly	utility,	an	excessive	degree	of	microgrid	customization	to	perform	
optimally	 in	a	given	 set	of	 circumstances	can	 introduce	 substantial	 additional	 complexity	and	
cost.		MUM	development	thus	far	has	no	doubt	been	highly	susceptible	to	this	pitfall,	as	most	
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MUM	plans	have	required	significant	adaption	to	account	for	existing	infrastructure,	customer	
needs,	utility	requirements,	tariff	restrictions,	and	so	on.	
	
Rather	 than	offering	 bespoke	 solutions,	 parties	 seeking	 to	 advance	MUM	development	must	
adopt	 a	 “modular	 and	 scalable”	 approach,	 similar	 to	 how	 vendors	 of	 power	 and	 cooling	
solutions	view	their	infrastructure	offerings	to	data	centers.		While	a	microgrid	may	inevitably	
consist	 of	 a	 large	 number	 of	 potential	 components,	 the	 components	 must	 be	 sufficiently	
standardized	 so	 that	 they	 can	 easily	 be	 combined	 with	 minimal	 alteration.	 	 By	 combining	
standardized	modular	components	together,	any	given	project	can	be	customized	for	the	needs	
to	 the	 specific	 MUM,	 and	 developers	 will	 be	 able	 to	 create	 a	 manageable	 number	 of	
standardized	solutions	across	the	multiple	dimensions	of	MUM	design.		
	
Greater	 commonality	 of	 rules	 and	 regulations,	 as	 well	 as	 standards	 for	 interoperability	 and	
communication,	will	improve	economic	viability	of	a	greater	number	of	MUM	opportunities,	by:	
	
• Streamlining	review	and	approval	by	regulators	and	other	permitting	authorities	
• Systematizing	understanding	and	facilitating	learning	across	projects	
• Reducing	engineering,	installation,	commissioning,	interconnection,	and	other	soft	costs	
of	development	
• Allowing	 cost	 reductions	 in	 equipment	 via	 economies	 of	 scale	 and	 in	 shipping	 via	
standardized	logistics	
• Making	 projects	 easier	 for	 financiers	 to	 value	 and	 invest	 in,	 thereby	 opening	 up	 new	
sources	of	capital	
Creating	Viable	Mechanisms	Valuing	and	Monetizing	MUM	Services:		
There	is	a	significant	need	for	agreed-upon	mechanisms	to	both	calculate	the	value	of	resilience	
and	other	benefits	offered	by	MUMs,	and	allow	at	 least	some	of	this	value	to	be	captured	by	
the	 MUM	 provider	 –	 otherwise	 one	 of	 the	 main	 economic	 benefits	 associated	 with	 MUM	
development	cannot	be	used	to	support	financing	of	usually-significant	capital	costs.		
	
The	approach	for	calculating	the	value	of	resilience	must	first	and	foremost	reflect	the	fact	that	
the	 value	 of	 resilience	 varies	 substantially	 between	 users.	 	 This	 need	 for	 user-specific	
calculation	must	be	balanced	with	the	need	for	a	calculation	methodology	to	be	both	rigorous	
and	acceptable	to	all	parties.		
	
In	addition	 to	 standardizing	a	methodology	 for	benefit-cost	 analysis	 (BCA)	 calculations	of	 the	
expected	value	of	resilience,	reliability,	and	grid	flexibility	offered	by	MUMs,	valuation	methods	
could	benefit	from	leveraging	more	advanced	valuation	practices.			
	
For	 example,	 if	 one	 conceptualizes	 participation	 in	 a	 MUM	 as	 providing	 flexibility	 (for	 both	
connected	 customers	 and	 the	 associated	distribution	utility)	 in	 the	 event	 of	 uncertain	 future	
events,	it	is	possible	to	use	real	options	analysis	to	value	the	added	benefit	of	this	flexibility.		In	
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this	 example,	 the	 MUM	may	 offer	 customers	 and	 /	 or	 the	 distribution	 utility	 the	 ability	 to	
choose	 between	 using	 on-site	 generation	 assets,	 drawing	 from	 energy	 storage,	 purchasing	
power	 from	 the	 grid,	 or	 reducing	 load	 in	 the	 event	 of	 constrained	 electricity	 availability.		
Because	 there	 is	 uncertainty	 about	 future	 events	 and	 about	 the	 future	 value	 of	 these	
alternatives,	the	flexibility	to	choose	among	them	at	a	point	in	the	future	(when	their	relative	
values	are	known)	has	value.			
	
Using	 valuation	methods	 such	 as	 real	 options	 to	 supplement	 the	expected	 value	 calculations	
based	on	the	expected	frequency	and	cost	of	outages	will	advance	a	robust	and	comprehensive	
methodology	for	valuing	MUM	services	throughout	the	connected	system.	
	
With	 an	 agreed-upon	 methodology	 for	 valuing	 resilience	 and	 other	 services,	 the	 next	
requirement	is	an	acceptable	means	through	which	the	MUM	operator	is	able	to	capture	some	
of	this	value	for	the	purposes	of	economic	and	financial	viability.		This	is	a	rate	design	question,	
but	 the	 rules	 for	what	and	how	 the	MUM	operator	 is	 allowed	 to	price	and	 collect	payments	
from	users	are	not	yet	well	developed	–	and	in	fact	relate	to	the	question	of	whether	the	MUM	
is	considered	a	regulated	utility.		
	
Many	 alternative	 pricing	 structures	 could	 be	 considered,	 including	 such	 possibilities	 as	 flat	
monthly	 fees	 for	 resilience	 service	 and	 premium	 pricing	 per	 kWh,	 to	 reflect	 the	 value	 of	
resilience	provided	by	the	MUM.	While	no	one	rate	structure	might	be	best	 for	all	 scenarios,	
MUM	 developers	 need	 clarity	 on	what	 collection	mechanisms	 are	 allowed	 and	 accepted,	 to	
support	 the	 revenue	 projections	 in	 their	 business	 plans	 and	 discussions	 with	 prospective	
investors.		
	
An	 example	 of	 progress	 in	 this	 area	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 proposed	 Potsdam	 community	
microgrid,	 in	 which	 National	 Grid	 is	 proposing	 a	 tiered	 tariff	 cost	 recovery	 plan.	 	 In	 this	
approach,	customers	that	receive	the	greatest	benefit	from	resilience	provided	by	the	microgrid	
(i.e.,	 those	with	 the	 greatest	 potential	 cost	 of	 lost	 service)	 contribute	 the	most	 to	 the	 tiered	
tariff.	 	Thus,	 in	 the	event	of	a	macrogrid	outage,	 it	 is	planned	 that	 the	microgrid	will	provide	
highest	priority	in	its	service	to	the	hospital	and	municipal	emergency	services,	as	they	will	be	
paying	more	 in	 the	 tiered	 tariff	 than	 other	 customers.	 	 (Further	 detail	 on	 the	 tiered	 pricing	
approach	being	implemented	at	the	Potsdam	microgrid	is	presented	in	Appendix	1.)	
	
Learning	from	MUM	Innovations	Elsewhere:	
	
In	 general,	 microgrid	 stakeholders	 should	 look	 to	 path-breaking	 models	 that	 are	 advancing	
innovative	models	for	multi-user	microgrids.		
	
Arguably	the	most	prominent	example	forging	a	path	for	new	utility-owned	MUM	potential	 is	
the	Bronzeville	microgrid	in	Chicago.		At	Bronzeville,	the	utility	Commonwealth	Edison	(ComEd)	
plans	to	construct	a	new	microgrid	that	will	 integrate	with	an	existing	microgrid	at	the	Illinois	
Institute	of	Technology	and	operate	it	over	a	ten	year	period	to	inform	ComEd	on	how	to	most	
efficiently	 operate	 interconnected	microgrid	 networks.	 	 Once	 fully	 completed,	 the	microgrid	
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will	be	able	to	serve	peak	demands	(estimated	at	7	MW)	even	during	an	islanding	event	of	over	
a	thousand	customers	from	a	diverse	user-mix,	including	residential,	commercial	and	industrial	
customers.	
	
An	important	aspect	of	the	Bronzeville	microgrid	is	that	its	costs	will	be	dispersed	across	all	of	
ComEd’s	 nearly	 4.1	 million	 ratepayers,	 even	 though	 when	 only	 a	 thousand	 customers	 will	
directly	benefit	from	the	microgrid.	However,	ComEd	successfully	argued	to	its	state	regulator	
(the	 Illinois	 Commerce	 Commission)	 that	 all	 of	 its	 ratepayers,	 the	 public,	 and	 other	 relevant	
stakeholders	 will	 benefit	 from	 the	 microgrid	 and	 that	 much	 will	 be	 learned	 from	 this	 pilot	
project	for	microgrid	interconnections.		
	
In	addition,	ComEd	initially	planned	to	own	the	generation	assets	on	the	Bronzeville	microgrid,	
even	though	it	had	previously	voluntarily	divested	all	of	its	generation	assets	following	the	1997	
restructuring	 of	 the	 Illinois	 electricity	 sector.	 Accordingly,	 ComEd’s	 intentions	 to	 own	 the	
Bronzeville	generation	assets	drew	significant	pushback	 from	certain	 interest	groups	who	did	
not	 want	 this	 MUM	 project	 to	 set	 a	 precedent	 for	 more	 utility-owned	 generation	 assets.	
However,	ComEd	exhibited	the	willingness	to	cooperate	and	find	a	satisfactory	solution:		rather	
than	fighting	the	pushback,	ComEd	agreed	to	facilitate	a	competitive	bidding	process	for	third-
parties	to	own	and	operate	the	microgrid’s	generation	assets	–	and	if	no	reasonable	bids	were	
made,	ComEd	would	lease	the	generation	assets.	
	
Although	 still	 under	 development,	 the	 Bronzeville	 MUM	 serves	 as	 a	 model	 for	 MUMs	 by	
highlighting	many	of	the	common	attributes	of	other	successful	MUMs,	including:	
	
• Direct	utility	involvement	
• Utilization	of	preexisting	infrastructure	
• Ambitious	in	its	goals/scope		
• Diverse	user-mix	
• Multiple	phases	of	development	
	
Two	attributes	of	 the	Bronzeville	MUM	 in	particular	 stand	 in	notable	contrast	 to	many	other	
MUMs	under	development:	the	ambition	of	the	goals/scope	and	the	diversity	of	the	user	mix.		
Most	importantly,	Bronzeville	demonstrates	the	importance	of	utilities,	regulators,	and	relevant	
stakeholders	 keeping	 an	 open	 mind	 and	 acknowledging	 each	 other’s	 respective	 concerns	
through	negotiations	and	concessions.	
	
The	 lessons	 learned	 from	Bronzeville	will	 inevitably	be	 important	 for	other	MUMs,	especially	
utility-owned	 MUMs.	 	 As	 Bronzeville	 and	 other	 pioneering	 MUMs	 are	 pursued	 and	
implemented,	their	trials	and	triumphs	need	to	be	fully	understood,	communicated	and	applied	
to	future	MUM	development	activities.	
	
Additionally,	there	are	early	signs	that	privately	developed	and	owned	MUMs	may	also	provide	
a	 channel	of	opportunity	 that	 takes	advantage	of	a	different	 set	of	 stakeholder	benefits.	The	
example	of	the	Philadelphia	Navy	Yard	microgrid	demonstrates	how	this	kind	of	MUM	becomes	
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feasible,	 and	 many	 similar	 projects	 are	 currently	 being	 considered	 throughout	 our	 study	
geography.		
	
Organizing	for	Greater	Impact:	
	
Although	a	growing	number	of	conferences	are	being	convened	on	the	topic	of	microgrids,	with	
the	annual	Microgrid	Knowledge	conferencexii	arguably	being	the	best	and	most	well-attended,	
the	microgrid	 community	 generally	 lacks	 a	 focal	 point	 –	 such	as	 a	 trade	association	–	 that	 is	
well-positioned	 to	 serve	 in	 convening,	 educational,	 research	 and	 advocacy	 capacities.	 	 No	
doubt,	this	reflects	the	fact	that	the	microgrid	market	is	still	immature	and	consequently	small,	
but	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 the	 microgrid	 market	 will	 remain	 underdeveloped	 unless	 and	 until	
stakeholders	organize	for	impact	and	provide	necessary	leadership	for	market	participants.			
	
Future Research 
	
This	report	appears	to	be	one	of	the	first	in	the	overall	body	of	literature	to	address	issues	that	
specifically	pertain	to	multi-user	microgrids.		As	such,	this	report	should	be	viewed	as	an	initial	
attempt	 to	 identify	 and	 frame	 the	 issues	 in	 such	 a	 manner	 that	 they	 lend	 themselves	 to	
additional	further	analysis.	
	
We	 believe	we	 have	 accomplished	 this	 goal	 to	 a	 substantial	 degree,	 and	 offer	 the	 following	
suggestions	for	follow-on	research:	
	
1. Summarize	status	of	state	regulations	and	laws	that	impinge	upon	MUM	development.		
Each	 state	 defines	 in	 its	 own	 unique	 manner	 how	 the	 topics	 raised	 in	 this	 report	 –	
exclusivity	 of	 delivery	 and	 sale	 of	 electricity,	 ability	 to	 cross	 public	 ROWs,	 viability	 of	
MUM	ownership	structures	–	shall	be	interpreted	for	legal	and	public	policy	purposes.		A	
summary	of	state	 regulations/laws	relevant	 to	MUM	activity	would	enable	geographic	
priorities	 to	 be	 set	 for	 clarification	 activities,	 as	 well	 as	 offer	 possible	 templates	 for	
preferred	wording	in	policy	recommendations.	
	
2. Design	an	ideal	model	for	enabling	legislation.	A	collaborative	effort	to	design	a	model	
for	enabling	legislation	in	a	coordinated	and	cohesive	manner	would	provide	a	guide	for	
state-level	regulatory	initiatives	that	facilitate	MUM	development.	Leveraging	research	
efforts	 and	 learning	 across	 states	 would	 both	 reduce	 the	 aggregate	 costs	 of	 policy	
advancement	 and	 promote	 policy	 consistency	 across	 jurisdictions	 so	 as	 to	 reduce	 the	
soft	costs	of	MUM	development	going	forward.		
	
3. Evaluate	 lessons	 from	 insurance	 industry	 regarding	 pricing	 and	 product	 design.	 	 The	
provision	of	power	resilience	services	to	customers	is	in	many	ways	akin	to	an	insurance	
policy.	 	 As	 such,	 it	would	 likely	 be	 highly	 illuminating	 to	 delve	 into	 how	underwriters	
price	 and	 design	 policies	 to	 determine	 lessons	 learned	 that	 are	 relevant	 and	 can	 be	
offered	to	the	microgrid	community.	In	particular,	insurance	companies	are	well-versed	
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at	valuing	low	probability,	high-impact	events	such	as	prolonged	macrogrid	outages,	and	
these	 methods	 could	 be	 informative	 in	 developing	 standardized	 methodologies	 for	
valuing	MUM	services.		
	
4. Monitor	progress	of	Bronzeville	and	summarize	 implications	 (and	pros/cons)	of	utility-
ownership	 of	 MUMs.	 	 As	 discussed	 above,	 utility-ownership	 alleviates	 many	 of	 the	
challenges	facing	potential	MUM	opportunities.		From	this,	a	substantial	share	of	future	
MUMs	will	probably	be	owned	by	utilities.		However,	it	is	likely	that	there	are	negative	
consequences	of	MUMs	when	 they	are	developed	and	owned	by	utilities.	 	Moreover,	
most	 parties	 of	 interest	will	want	 to	 ensure	 that	 utilities	 have	 the	 ability,	 but	 not	 an	
exclusive	ability,	to	develop	and	own	MUMs.		Because	utility-owned	MUMs	are	largely	
untested	 as	 yet,	 further	 research	 on	 this	 area	 is	 warranted	 as	 progress	 is	 made,	
including	whether	 and	 how	 the	 ability	 for	 utilities	 to	 own	MUMs	might	 disadvantage	
alternative	 service	 providers,	 and	 if/how	 the	 ability	 for	 utilities	 to	 participate	 in	 (and	
profit	from)	MUMs	other	than	by	owning	assets	might	alleviate	any	concerns.	
	
5. Undertake	customer-focused	research.		This	research	was	oriented	towards	identifying	
the	barriers	to	MUM	development	–	from	the	perspective	of	those	who	might	seek	to	
develop/implement	a	MUM	on	behalf	of	multiple	 customers.	 	 In	 turn,	 this	begs	many	
questions	about	customer	needs	and	preferences	 for	MUMs.	 	Of	note,	 it	appears	 that	
most	MUM	initiatives	to	date	have	been	driven	by	desire	for	enhanced	power	resilience,	
yet	 it	 would	 be	 interesting	 to	 test	 how	 important	 environmental	 considerations	 –	 as	
reflected	by	increasing	quantities	of	corporate	purchasing	of	renewable	energy	–	might	
be	 among	 the	 potential	 customer	 base	 for	 MUM	 developers.	 In	 general,	 further	
incorporating	 customers	 into	 the	 MUM	 development	 stakeholder	 ecosystem	 will	 be	
valuable.			
	
6. Improve	 and	 maintain	 microgrid	 database.	 	 The	 database	 of	 microgrids	 that	 was	
developed	for	this	research	is	limited	to	the	Northeastern	United	States	(corresponding	
to	 the	 area	 of	 interest	 to	 the	 Northeast	 Clean	 Energy	 Council,	 one	 of	 the	 project’s	
partners),	and	moreover	represents	a	snapshot	in	time	in	early	2018.		It	would	be	useful	
to	expand	the	dataset	beyond	the	Northeastern	United	States,	and	to	refresh	the	data	
on	a	periodic	basis,	providing	a	better	information	set	from	which	to	identify	and	follow	
emerging	trends	in	MUM	activity.		
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Appendix 1: Summary of MUMs Selected for Case Studies 
	
Baltimore	Gas	&	Electric	Public	Purpose	Microgrids	
Customer	Base	 Commercial	entities	(gas	station,	bank,	grocery	store),	Academic	and	
Hospital	
Utility	and	Location	 Baltimore	Gas	&	Electric	(Exelon	subsidiary);	Baltimore,	MD	and	
Columbia,	MD	
Status	 Proposal	rejected	by	Maryland	Public	Service	Commission	(MPSC)	
Motivation	for	Microgrid	 Public	Benefit	Microgrid	–	Reliability	and	resilience	for	critical	
community	services	
Generation	/	storage	assets	 3	MW	natural	gas;	2	MW	natural	gas	
Obstacles	Encountered:	 1) Inequitable	allocation	of	costs	vs.	benefits	
2) Regulatory	interpretations	of	service	requirements	
3) Overreliance	on	natural	gas	generation	
Effective	Actions	Taken:	 1) N/A,	as	the	microgrid	proposal	was	rejected	by	the	MPSC.	
However,	the	reasons	provided	in	the	rejection	have	been	
used	as	working	guidelines	and	expectations	for	subsequent	
microgrid	proposals	in	the	state.		
	
In	December	 2015,	 Baltimore	Gas	 and	 Electric	 (BG&E)	 submitted	 a	 proposal	 for	 two	 separate	 “public	
purpose”	microgrids	to	the	Maryland	Public	Service	Commission	(MPSC),	to	serve	as	pilot	studies	for	the	
implementation	of	MUMs	in	the	state	of	Maryland.xiii	
	
• The	 first	microgrid	was	 proposed	 to	 be	 located	 in	 Baltimore,	 at	 the	 4600	 block	 of	 Edmonson	
Avenue.	A	microgrid	 at	 this	 location	would	 service	 a	major	 grocery	 store	 and	pharmacy,	 local	
restaurants	 and	a	medical	 center	 (amongst	other	buildings	 and	 facilities).	 The	given	proposed	
microgrid	was	to	be	powered	by	a	3	MW	natural	turbine	and	cost	approximately	$9.2-million	to	
develop	and	implement.		
	
• The	second	microgrid	was	proposed	 to	be	 located	along	Guilford	Road	 in	Columbia,	Maryland	
(Howard	County).	This	proposed	microgrid	was	to	service	a	gas	station,	high	school,	pharmacy,	
and	local	meeting	house.	The	proposed	Howard	County	microgrid	would	be	serviced	by	2MW	of	
natural	gas	generation	and	cost	approximately	$7.4	million.		
	
In	 developing	 these	microgrid	 proposals,	 BG&E	 chose	 sites	where	 easily	 adaptable	 infrastructure	was	
already	 available,	 and	 close	 to	 critical	 community	 facilities	 –	 such	 as	 urgent	 care	 facilities	 (hospitals,	
medical	offices),	schools	(or	other	places	of	shelter),	gas	stations	and	grocery	stores	–	that	would	benefit	
most	from	improved	resilience	enabled	by	the	implementation	of	microgrids.		
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Under	its	microgrid	proposal,	BG&E	was	to	construct,	own	and	operate	all	assets	of	the	two	microgrids,	
including	generation	as	well	as	distribution.	 	The	cost	of	the	microgrids	was	to	be	recouped	through	a	
monthly	tariff	applied	to	all	BG&E	customers.		
	
In	 July	 2016,	 the	 MPSC	 rejected	 the	 BG&E	 microgrid	 proposalxiv	 for	 several	 reasons,	 including:		
	
1) The	proposed	monthly	tariff	to	recoup	microgrid	costs	would	be	applied	to	all	BG&E	customers	
and	not	just	those	customers	benefitting	from	the	microgrid;	
2) The	microgrids	would	solely	rely	on	natural	gas	generation	assets	(as	opposed	to	renewables);	
and	
3) When	operating	under	“island-mode”,	microgrid	customers	no	longer	have	the	option	to	choose	
the	 electricity	 supplier	 –	 as	 is	 mandatory	 in	 Maryland	 since	 the	 electricity	 market	 was	
restructured	in	the	late	1990s.		
	
While	 the	BG&E	microgrid	proposal	was	 rejected,	 the	MPSC’s	 rationale	 for	 rejecting	 the	proposal	has	
subsequently	helped	establish	loose	guidelines	and	expectations	for	microgrids	in	Maryland.		Following	
BG&E’s	 failed	 proposal,	 the	 MPSC	 initiated	 PC44	 to	 study	 electric	 distribution	 systems	 that	 are	
sustainable,	customer-centric,	affordable	and	reliable	–	such	as	microgrids.		
	
In	October	2017,	PEPCO	(another	subsidiary	of	Exelon	serving	other	parts	of	Maryland)	submitted	their	
own	proposal	to	the	MPSC	for	“Public	Purpose”	microgrids.xv	Like	BG&E’s	proposal,	the	microgrid	would	
service	community	health	centers,	grocery	stores,	gas	stations,	etc.	in	the	event	of	an	outage.		However,	
there	are	distinct	differences	that	address	the	responses	BG&E	received.	For	instance:	
	
1) The	microgrids	would	rely	on	natural	gas	generation	plus	renewable	PV	and	storage	
2) PEPCO	would	 solicit	 developers	 to	 build	 the	microgrid	 through	 a	 competitive	 bidding	 process	
and	the	developer	or	another	third	party	would	own	the	generation	assets.	
3) PEPCO	proposed	that	 the	microgrid	customers	can	retain	whatever	retail	energy	supplier	 they	
choose,	meaning	 the	 supply	 rate	 the	 customer	 pays	 would	 not	 be	 affected	 by	 the	microgrid	
development.		
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Bronzeville	Microgrid	
Customer	Base	 1060	residential,	commercial,	and	industrial	customers		
Utility	and	Location	 Commonwealth	Edison	(Exelon	subsidiary);	Chicago,	IL	
Status	 Under	Development	
Motivation	for	Microgrid	 Demonstration	project	for	interconnected	microgrid	network	
Generation	/	storage	assets	 Planned	7	MW	load	across	two	phases:	
Phase	1:	2.5	MW	load	with	solar	PV	and	battery	ESS,	and	diesel	
generators	
Phase	2:	4.5	additional	MW	load,	7	MW	of	natural	gas	and	diesel	
generation	
Obstacles	Encountered:	 1) Opposition	to	cost-sharing	across	entire	customer	base	
	
2) Opposition	to	utility	re-entering	generation	ownership	
business	
Effective	Actions	Taken:	 1) Constructive	engagement	between	utility,	regulators	and	
other	stakeholders	to	resolve	issues	
	
2) Scaling	back	ambitious	plan	for	6	microgrids,	which	drew	
concerns	over	fair	competition	from	alternative	energy	
providers		
	
3) Allowing	for	private	entities	to	purchase	generation	assets	
	
4) Phased	development	
	
The	Bronzeville	microgrid	is	a	planned	community	MUM	that	will	interconnect	a	new	microgrid	
with	 a	 pre-existing	 microgrid	 at	 the	 Illinois	 Institute	 of	 Technology	 in	 the	 Bronzeville	
neighborhood	on	the	south	side	of	Chicago.		Once	completed,	the	microgrid	will	serve	roughly	
1,060	 customers	 from	 a	 diverse	 user-mix,	 including	 residential,	 commercial	 and	 industrial	
customers,	and	have	an	aggregate	load	of	7	MW.			
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The	 local	electric	utility	Commonwealth	Edison	 (ComEd)	 is	planning	 the	project,	as	a	pilot	 for	
gathering	data	over	a	ten-year	period	to	inform	how	to	most	efficiently	operate	interconnected	
microgrid	networks,	in	two	phases:	
	
• The	first	phase	will	cost	$8	million,	involve	750	KW	of	solar	PV	with	500	MWh	of	battery	
storage,	and	serve	490	customers	with	2.3	MW	of	load.	
• The	second	phase	will	cost	$17	million,	largely	involving	diesel	and	natural	gas	turbines,	
and	incorporate	an	additional	570	customers	with	about	5	MW	of	load.	
	
Upon	completion,	the	Bronzeville	microgrid	will	be	able	to	support	the	peak	electricity	demand	
of	all	its	customers	during	an	islanding	event.	Consequently,	the	microgrid	operator	won’t	need	
to	worry	about	prioritizing	certain	users	to	determine	a	feasible	load	shedding	protocol.		
	
There	 has	 been	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 debate	 over	 the	 proposed	Bronzeville	microgrid.	 	One	major	
criticism	is	that	the	microgrid	costs	are	dispersed	evenly	across	all	of	ComEd’s	nearly	4.1	million	
ratepayers,	 while	 only	 1,060	 will	 directly	 benefit	 from	 the	 microgrid.	 	 However,	 ComEd	
successfully	 argued	 to	 the	 Illinois	 Commerce	 Commission	 (ICC)	 that	 all	 of	 its	 customers	 and	
other	stakeholders	will	benefit	from	the	microgrid	based	on	what	will	be	learned	from	this	pilot	
project	 for	 use	 in	 subsequent	 microgrids	 –	 for	 a	 cost	 said	 to	 be	 “pennies	 per	 month	 per	
customer”.		
	
Another	major	criticism	was	that	ComEd	planned	to	own	the	generation	assets	of	the	project.	
Since	 the	 Illinois	electricity	market	was	 restructured	 in	1997,	ComEd	had	voluntarily	divested	
itself	 of	 its	 generation	 assets,	 and	 ComEd’s	 plans	 to	 own	 generation	 on	 the	 Bronzeville	
microgrid	 raised	 concerns	 that	 this	 would	 set	 an	 adverse	 precedent.	 Rather	 than	 fighting	
pushback	from	concerned	parties,	ComEd	agreed	to	facilitate	a	competitive	bidding	process	for	
third-parties	to	own	and	operate	the	microgrid’s	generation	assets	–	unless	no	reasonable	bids	
were	made,	in	which	case	ComEd	will	step	in	to	lease	the	generation	assets.	
	
Although	 still	 under	 development,	 the	 Bronzeville	 microgrid	 is	 a	 promising	 illustration	 of	
successful	MUMs,	and	merits	continued	monitoring	of	progress.	
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Burrstone	Energy	Center	
Customer	Base	 Academic	and	medical	(3,000-student	college,	300-bed	hospital,	and	
200	bed	nursing	home)	
Utility	and	Location	 National	Grid;	Utica,	NY	
Status	 Operational	
Motivation	for	Microgrid	 Lower	electricity	costs;	Improved	resilience	during	extreme	weather	
Generation	/	storage	assets	 3x	1,100	kW	natural	gas	turbines;	1x	334	kW	natural	gas	turbine;	
Steam	and	heat	to	hospital	
Obstacles	Encountered:	 1) Right-of-way	dispute	with	utility	
Effective	Actions	Taken:	 1) Developing	innovative	economic	models	via	PPA	with	NG	and	
developing	pilot	program	to	sell	back	electricity	to	NG	during	
critical	hours	for	a	premium	price	
	
2) Successfully	overcoming	right	of	way	dispute	through	the	
award	of	a	waiver	from	the	Public	Service	Commission	
	
In	 upstate	Utica	NY,	 the	 Burrstone	 Energy	 Center	 is	 a	 shining	 example	 of	 a	multi-user	microgrid	 that	
overcame	 significant	 regulatory	 hurdles,	 exhibits	 an	 innovative	 economic	 model,	 and	 is	 owned	 by	 a	
third-party	 developer	 that	 is	 neither	 the	 local	 utility	 nor	 affiliated	 with	 its	 three	 sizable	 institutional	
customers:		
	
1)	 Faxton-St.	Luke’s	Hospital	
2)	 St.	Luke’s	Nursing	Home	
3)	 Utica	College	
	
The	developer	and	owner	of	the	Burrstone	Energy	Center,	Cogen	Power	Technologies	(CPT)	developed	
and	 pursued	 a	 15-year	 business	 model	 that	 produces	 revenue	 by	 providing	 electricity	 to	 all	 three	
customers	(plus	steam	and	heat	sales	to	the	hospital)	and	selling	electricity	to	National	Grid	via	a	Power	
Purchase	Agreement	 (PPA)	 in	which	 they	are	 reimbursed	at	 the	wholesale	 electricity	price	during	 the	
hour	of	the	sale.		
	
The	Burrstone	Energy	Center	also	managed	to	overcome	one	of	the	most	prominent	barriers	to	multi-
user	microgrids:	 	 exclusive	 franchise	 rights	 to	 the	 crossing	 of	 public	 right	 of	ways.	 In	 order	 to	 deliver	
electricity	to	Utica	College,	CPT	was	obligated	to	cross	a	public	right	of	way.		Although	substantial	legal	
efforts	were	required,	CPT	was	eventually	granted	the	permission	they	needed	to	bring	the	project	to	
successful	completion.			
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Philadelphia	Navy	Yard	(PNY)	(existing	community	statistics)	
Customer	Base	 Commercial,	Industrial,	and	Academic	involving	over	7	million	SF	in	
operation,	150+	businesses	and	13,000	employees.	The	long	range	
development	plan	anticipates	adding	as	much	as	1,500	resident	units	
and	growing	the	total	community	to	as	much	as	18	million	SF.	
Utility	and	Location	 Philadelphia	Electric	Co	(Exelon	subsidiary);	Philadelphia,	PA	and	The	
Navy	Yard	Electric	Utility	(TNYEU)	operated	privately	by	PIDC	
Status	 First	phase	complete;	expanding	capacity	
Motivation	for	Microgrid	 Economic/	commercial	development	
Generation	/	storage	assets	 8	MW	natural	gas	peaker	plant,	800	kW	Bloom	nitrogen	fuel	cell	
generator,	and	400	kW	community	solar	(planned	expansion	to	1	
MW)	
Obstacles	Encountered:	 1) Rehabilitating	 and	 upgrading	 the	 aging	 distribution	 network	
previously	installed	at	the	Navy	Yard	
	
2) Attracting	 more	 industrial	 and	 commercial	 utilization	 with	
limited	existing	generation	assets	
	
3) Managing	 numerous	 utility,	 regulatory,	 state,	 and	 local	
stakeholders	
	
Effective	Actions	Taken:	 1) A.	 Prioritizing	 the	 development	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	
PNY	 network	 operations	 center	 to	 remotely	 monitor	 and	
control	power	distribution	and	generation	
	
B.	 Implementing	 smart	 meters	 and	 supervisory	 control	 and	
data	acquisition	(SCADA)	technologies	
	
2) A.	 PNY	 first	 step	 was	 to	 create	 a	 comprehensive	 Energy	
Master	 Plan,	 which	 evaluated	 current	 capabilities,	 current	
needs,	and	needs	for	future	development.	
		
B.	 PNY	 prioritizes	 microgrid	 services	 to	 largest	 industrial/	
commercial	stakeholders.		
		
	
The	Philadelphia	Navy	Yard	(PNY)	was	once	one	of	the	most	prominent	Naval	Yards	in	the	United	States.	
In	2000,	Philadelphia	Industrial	Development	Corporation	(PIDC)	acquired	the	PNY,	a	1,200-acre	facility,	
on	behalf	of	the	City	of	Philadelphia	in	order	to	catalyze	economic	development	at	a	site	that	had	fallen	
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into	disuse.	By	2004,	a	comprehensive	master	plan	was	drafted	to	transform	the	PNY	into	a	sustainable,	
mixed-use	development.		
The	PNY	development	team	spent	years	determining	the	ideal	commercial	and	industrial	mix	necessary	
to	target.	Knowing	the	desired	scale	of	development	and	the	current	capabilities,	PNY	turned	their	focus	
to	drafting	an	updated	Navy	Yard	Energy	Master	Plan	(NYEMP).		The	updated	EMP	was	finalized	in	2013	
and	outlined	initiatives	that	supported	their	goals	for	expansion.	The	EMP	included	plans	for	advanced	
metering,	 a	 network	 operation	 center,	 distribution	 automation,	 grid	 expansion,	 energy	 efficiency	
programs,	 self-generation	 and	 even	 proposed	 utility	 business	models	 –	 all	 of	 which	 centered	 around	
expanding	and	updating	the	infrastructure	in	to	a	35	MW	hybrid	microgrid.		
With	 the	 acquisition	 of	 the	 Navy	 Yard,	 PIDC	 and	 the	 City	 of	 Philadelphia	 acquired	 the	 largest,	
independent	 and	 unregulated,	 non-military	 electrical	 grids	 (i.e.	 microgrids)	 in	 the	 country	 (albeit	
outdated,	with	 limited	capacity).	By	drafting	a	comprehensive	Master	Plan	and	the	updated	EMP,	PNY	
provided	a	 strong	business	plan	 for	 expanding	 the	microgrid	 in	 an	economically	 and	 financially	 viable	
manner.	 And	 because	 of	 its	 historical	 designation,	 the	microgrid	 expansion	 faced	minimal	 regulatory	
hurdles	during	 its	construction	–	allowing	for	efficient	completion	of	 the	project.	However,	due	to	the	
nature	 of	 the	 project,	 the	 updated	 EMP	 alone	 had	 to	 receive	 buy-in	 from	 nearly	 60	 different	
stakeholders	including	property	owners,	developers,	tenants,	utilities,	etc.		
As	of	2017,	the	PNY	microgrid	served	80	customers	with	188	revenue-grade	meters,	with	more	than	7	
million	SF	in	operation	employing	13,000	workers.		The	microgrid	boasts	existing	capacity	of	34	MW	via	
two	 substations,	 with	 a	 third	 substation	 that	 will	 provide	 an	 additional	 10	 MW	 of	 capacity	 under	
construction,	 thus	 providing	 redundancy.	 	 Approximately	 92%	 of	 the	 total	 electric	 usage	 on	 the	 PNY	
microgrid	 is	 currently	 purchased	 externally	 from	 wholesale	 energy	 provider	 Constellation	 Energy	 (a	
subsidiary	of	Exelon)	and	delivered	to	the	PNY	by	the	local	utility	Philadelphia	Electric	Company	(another	
subsidiary	of	Exelon).		
To	 date,	 capital	 costs	 for	 the	 microgrid’s	 development,	 including	 the	 various	 generation	 assets,	 is	
approaching	 $34	 million,	 but	 this	 may	 increase.	 	 Commercial	 and	 industrial	 growth	 at	 the	 PNY	 is	
forecasted	to	result	in	electric	load	increasing	from	34	MW	in	2014	to	60	MW	by	2022.	Once	complete,	
the	PNY	microgrid	will	support	the	energy	needs	of	30,000	employees	and	1,500	residential	units,	and	
over	15	million	square	feet	of	mixed-use	space.	
As	of	now,	the	PNY’s	generation	sources	 include	a	6	MW	Natural	Gas	Peaker	Plant,	a	total	of	3.2	MW	
Combined	Heat	and	Power,	0.8	MW	of	fuel	cells,	and	a	1	MW	Solar	PV	array.		To	meet	load	growth,	PNY	
plans	to	expand	the	gas	peaker	with	an	additional	2	MW	by	the	end	of	2018.		However,	as	much	as	10	
MW	 of	 new	 supply	 from	 PECO	 may	 ultimately	 be	 needed	 to	 complement	 new	 distributed	 energy	
resources	(DERs)	and	demand	management	efforts.	
	
	
	 46	
Potsdam	Community	Microgrid	
Customer	Base	 Academic,	Hospital,	Municipal,	Commercial	and	~16,000	residents	
Utility	and	Location	 National	Grid;	Potsdam,	NY	
Status	 Conceptual/planning	phase	
Motivation	for	Microgrid	 Improved	resilience	during	extreme	weather	
Generation	/	storage	assets	 Pre-existing:	1.4	MW	CHP	generators	(x2),	500	kW	dams	(x2),	2	MW	
solar	
New:	3.2	MW	hydro,	natural	gas	CHP,	and	solar	PV	
Obstacles	Encountered:	 1) Aging	infrastructure	and	inclement	weather	
	
2) Justifying	 the	 additional	 incurred	 cost	 in	 an	 economically-
challenged	area	
	
Effective	Actions	Taken:	 1) Staged	 implementation	 approach,	 where	 stakeholders	 can	
approve	sequential	phases	of	construction	
	
2) Proposed	 tiered	 tariff	 recovery	 where	 those	 stakeholders	
who	benefit	 the	most	 from	 the	microgrid	also	pay	 the	most	
for	the	microgrid	services.	
	
The	 Potsdam	 Community	 Microgrid	 currently	 being	 planned	 is	 meant	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 demonstration	
project	for	the	New	York	Reforming	the	Energy	Vision	program	(NY	REV).		
	
Potsdam	is	a	remote	location	in	upstate	New	York,	less	than	30	miles	from	the	Canadian	border,	which	is	
challenged	by	intense	storms	during	the	winter.	As	such,	it	is	quite	difficult	for	a	utility	to	send	a	service	
truck	to	fix	infrastructure	during	an	extreme	weather	event.	To	make	matters	worse,	Potsdam	receives	
power	via	long	transmission	lines	that	are	especially	susceptible	to	extreme	weather.	Potsdam	faced	the	
consequences	of	these	vulnerabilities	in	1998	when	a	winter	storm	led	to	a	three-week	power	outage.		
	
For	 this	 reason,	 National	 Grid	 is	 developing	 plans	 for	 a	 community	 microgrid	 to	 provide	 increased	
resilience	 to	 many	 critical	 facilities	 in	 the	 Potsdam	 area,	 such	 as	 a	 hospital,	 local	 police	 and	 fire	
departments,	water	treatment	plants,	and	a	number	of	commercial	buildings.	
	
Thus	 far,	 the	Potsdam	microgrid	project	has	 received	nearly	$3	million	 in	 combined	 funding	 from	 the	
National	Science	Foundation	(NSF),	the	U.S.DOE	and	the	NYSERDA.		Part	of	the	cost-benefit/	engineering	
feasibility	study	was	funded	through	NYSERDA’s	Electric	Power	Transmission	and	Distribution	Smart	Grid	
Program.xvi	 The	 Potsdam	 microgrid	 development	 project	 was	 one	 of	 seven	 projects	 in	 New	 York	 to	
receive	funding	through	this	program.	Also,	while	the	conceptual	design	was	not	finished	in	time	to	be	
submitted	 for	 New	 York	 Prize	 Stage	 2	 consideration,	 it	 is	 still	 the	 goal	 of	 the	 project	 to	 submit	 a	
compelling	 New	 York	 Prize	 Stage	 3	 funding	 application.	 NYSERDA	 announced	 that	 the	 Stage	 3	
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application	deadline	has	been	delayed	to	the	end	of	2018,	which	the	Potsdam	project	team	full	expects	
to	meet.	 Any	 potential	 addition	 funding	 received	 through	NY	 Prize	would	 help	with	 the	 feasibility	 of	
implementation.		
	
As	 of	May	 2018,	 National	 Grid	 finished	 its	 engineering	 designs	 for	 the	microgrid	 and	 rate	 design	 for	
utility	owned	assets.	 	 If	the	project	 is	successfully	brought	to	completion,	National	Grid	hopes	for	 it	to	
serve	as	the	industry	standard	for	community	microgrids.		
	
Probably	the	two	most	distinctive	aspects	of	the	Potsdam	microgrid	are:	
	
• Its	phased	development	structure,	so	as	to	mitigate	“rate	shock”	via	a	large	one-time	lump-sum	
increase	in	local	electricity	prices.	As	illustrated	below,	the	Potsdam	demonstration	project	has	
outlined	six	different	proposed	stages	of	implementation.	
	
The	 first	 stage,	 which	 is	 identified	 as	 the	 “smaller	 footprint”,	 would	 cost	 approximately	 $30	
million	 to	 construct.	 The	 smaller	 footprint	 microgrid	 would	 connect	 Clarkson	 University,	 the	
Village	Civic	Center	and	the	Canton-Potsdam	Hospital	using	the	existing	hydro	power	and	DERs	
at	 Clarkson	University.	 Later	 stages	would	 sequentially	 add	 assets	 such	 as	 the	 SUNY-Potsdam	
CHP	and	the	community	solar	PV	as	well	as	tie	in	other	loads	like	waste	water	treatment	plant	
and	 the	 national	 grid	 service	 center.	 The	 phased	 development	 would	 spread	 the	 cost	 to	 the	
community	over	time	as	each	piece	is	approved.		
	
• A	tiered	pricing	tariff,	under	which	customers	that	have	the	greatest	needs	(and	corresponding	
willingness	 to	 pay)	 for	 greater	 resilience	 pay	 more	 for	 the	 microgrid.	 Future	 microgrid	
participants	would	be	assigned	tiers	based	on	the	benefits	received.		
	
Those	 participants	 with	 direct	 benefits	 and	 load	 generating	 capacity	 would	 be	 served	 at	 the	
highest	 priority	 (Tier	 1a),	 and	 those	 with	 critical	 services	 would	 be	 served	 at	 a	 close	 second	
priority	(Tier	1b).	Clarkson	University	and	the	Village	Government	would	fall	under	Tier	1a,	while	
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the	Hospital,	 Rescue	 Squad,	High	 School,	Grocery	 Store	 (and	 a	 few	others)	 fall	 under	 Tier	 1b.	
From	a	pricing	standpoint,	 the	Tier	1	participants	would	pay	 the	highest	 tariff.	The	 lowest	 tier	
(Tier	5)	is	the	residential	ratepayers	who	receive	indirect	benefits	from	the	microgrid	–	and	they	
would	pay	the	least	in	the	applied	tariff	structure.		
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Appendix 2: Northeast United States microgrid dataset 
	
This	appendix	details	the	data	set	of	microgrids	that	was	created	for	this	study.	
	
Title	of	Data:	Northeastern	United	States	Microgrid	Data	Set	
	
Database	Constructed	by:	Josef	Benzaoui	
Last	Updated:	July	19th,	2018	
Description	 of	 Data:	 This	 data	 set	 provides	 a	 comprehensive	 listing	 of	 microgrids	 in	 the	
Northeastern	 United	 States,	 and	 to	 the	 extent	 possible	 describes	 a	 number	 of	 variables	 or	
characteristics	for	each	microgrid.			
	
Sources	of	Data:		Various	public	sources	were	used	in	the	construction	of	this	data	set.	Sources	
of	information	for	each	microgrid	are	listed	in	the	data	set	record	for	that	microgrid.		
	
Variables	Explained:	
Cost:	This	value	represents	the	capital	cost	of	the	project,	when	available.	Sometimes	only	the	
overall	cost	of	the	project	(including	soft	costs)	 is	 listed	in	an	article	or	press	release	and	that	
value	is	used	instead.	If	neither	the	capital	nor	overall	cost	of	the	project	is	available,	the	value	
is	listed	as	9999.	
	
Amount	 Awarded:	 This	 value	 represents	 the	 total	 sum	 of	 grants	 awarded	 to	 the	 microgrid	
project.	If	no	grants	were	awarded	to	the	project,	this	value	is	listed	as	N/A.	If	it	is	uncertain	as	
to	whether	or	not	grants	were	awarded	or	 the	amount	of	grant	 funding	 is	not	available,	 this	
value	is	listed	as	9999.	
	
Application	Team:	This	list	of	organizations	represents	the	team	who	participated	in	the	grant	
application.	 If	no	grant	was	applied	for,	this	value	 is	 listed	as	N/A.	 If	an	application	to	a	grant	
program	was	made	but	the	team	members	are	unknown,	then	this	value	is	listed	as	9999.	
	
Critical	 Facilities:	 This	 list	 of	 facilities	 are	 those	 deemed	 critical	 to	 the	 town/community	 in	
which	the	microgrid	exists	by	the	project	team.	If	no	critical	facilities	are	a	part	of	the	microgrid,	
this	variable	is	listed	as	‘none’.	
	
Commercial	 Buildings:	 This	 list	 of	 facilities	 are	 commercial	 in	 nature	 and	 supported	 by	 the	
microgrid.	If	none	are	supported	by	the	microgrid,	this	variable	is	listed	as	‘none’.	
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Utility:	This	 is	the	utility	 (or	utilities)	that	operate	 in	the	area(s)	within	which	the	microgrid	 is	
located.		
	
Project	Status:	This	value	represents	the	most	currently	available	update	on	the	status	of	the	
microgrid.	For	projects	that	participated	in	the	NY	Prize	program:	
• If	the	value	is	listed	as	NY	Prize	Stage	1	Winner,	it	means	the	microgrid	was	a	stage	one	
winner	but	did	not	go	past	a	feasibility	study.		
• If	 the	 value	 is	 listed	as	 a	NY	Stage	2	Winner,	 it	means	 the	microgrid	was	a	 stage	 two	
winner	but	no	further	updates	were	available.		
• Some	stage	2	winners	had	publicly	available	 information	about	their	progress,	such	as	
becoming	operational,	and	are	listed	as	operational.	
	
Generation:	 This	 variable	 lists	 the	 most	 detailed	 information	 about	 the	 generation	
technology/assets	 utilized	 by	 the	 microgrid,	 or	 that	 was	 planned	 to	 be	 utilized	 as	 per	 the	
feasibility	study.	
	
Contact:	This	represents	the	most	specific	point	of	contact	associated	with	the	microgrid	or	its	
feasibility	 study.	 If	 no	 specific	 point	 of	 contact	 is	 available,	 a	 general	 company	 or	municipal	
representative	associated	with	the	project	is	listed.	If	no	contact	is	available,	the	value	is	listed	
as	9999.	
	
Contact	Info:	This	represents	contact	information	(phone,	email,	or	both)	for	the	listed	point	of	
contact.	If	no	contact	information	is	available,	this	value	is	listed	as	9999.	
	
State	Code:	This	value	is	a	numerically	coded	version	of	the	variable	called	State.	
	 1	=	Connecticut	
2	=	Maine	
3	=	Maryland	
4	=	Massachusetts	
5	=	New	Hampshire	
6	=	New	Jersey	
7	=	New	York	
8	=	Pennsylvania	
9	=	Rhode	Island	
10	=	Vermont	
	
Project	Status	Code:	This	value	is	a	numerically	coded	version	of	the	variable	called	Project	
Status.	
	
1	=	Applied	for	Grant	
2	=	Failed	
3	=	Feasibility	Study	
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4	=	Grant	Funded	
5	=	NY	Prize	Stage	1	Winner	
6	=	NY	Prize	Stage	2	Loser	
7	=	Operational	
8	=	Proposed	
9	=	Under	Development	
	
Multi-User:	This	is	a	binary	variable	that	represents	whether	the	microgrid	is	(or	is	planned	to	
be)	single-user	or	multi-user.	A	value	of	0	indicates	the	microgrid	is	single-user	and	a	value	of	1	
indicates	the	microgrid	is	multi-user.	If	that	information	is	uncertain	or	not	yet	determined	(as	
is	the	case	in	some	feasibility	studies),	it	is	listed	as	9999.	
	
User	Mix:	This	is	a	numerically	coded	variable	that	represents	the	mix	of	users	which	are	(or	are	
planned	to	be)	supported	by	the	microgrid.	If	more	than	one	type	of	user	is	supported,	it	is	
considered	mixed-use.	If	that	information	is	uncertain	or	not	yet	determined	(as	is	the	case	in	
some	feasibility	studies),	it	is	listed	as	9999.	
	
1	=	Industrial	
2	=	Commercial	
3	=	Residential	
4	=  Municipal	
5	=	Medical	
6	=	Education	
7	=	Mixed-use	(2	or	more	of	any	of	the	listed	user	types)	
8	=	Navy	
9	=	Military	
	
Generation	 Mix:	 This	 is	 a	 numerically-coded	 variable	 that	 represents	 the	 generation	
technologies/sources	 that	 are	 (or	 are	 planned	 to	 be)	 incorporated	 into	 the	microgrid.	 If	 that	
information	is	uncertain	or	not	yet	determined	(as	is	the	case	in	some	feasibility	studies),	 it	 is	
listed	as	9999.	
	
1	=	Solar	
2	=	Wind	
3	=	Hydro	
4	=	Natural	Gas	
5	=	Natural	Gas	with	CHP	
6	=	CHP	
7	=	Diesel	
8	=	Mixed	
9	=	Coal	
10	=	Fuel	Cell	
11	=	Waste	to	Energy	
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Storage:	This	 is	a	binary	variable	that	represents	whether	or	not	 the	microgrid	 includes	 (or	 is	
planned	 to	 include)	 storage	 technologies.	 A	 value	 of	 0	 indicates	 no	 storage	 and	 a	 value	 of	 1	
indicates	storage.	If	that	information	is	uncertain	or	not	yet	determined	(as	is	the	case	in	some	
feasibility	studies),	it	is	listed	as	9999.	
	
	
Islanding:	 	 This	 is	 a	 binary	 variable	 that	 represents	 whether	 or	 not	 the	microgrid	 has	 (or	 is	
planned	to	have)	islanding	capabilities.	A	value	of	0	indicates	no	islanding	capability	and	a	value	
of	1	indicates	islanding	capability.	If	that	information	is	uncertain	or	not	yet	determined	(as	is	
the	case	in	some	feasibility	studies),	it	is	listed	as	9999.	
	
Project	Count:		Dummy	variable	to	facilitate	counting	number	of	microgrids	satisfying	particular	
characteristic.	
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Appendix 3: Individuals Interviewed 
	
The	 following	 table	 lists	 the	 individuals	 that	were	 interviewed	 in	 the	 course	of	 this	 research.		
We	would	like	to	thank	these	individuals	for	their	perspectives	and	their	assistance.	
	
Interviewee	Name	 Organization/Company	
Ed	Linton	 Northern	Power	Systems	
Will	Agate	 Ameresco	(formerly	Philadelphia	Navy	Yard)	
Mark	Johnson	 Clean	Energy	Blockchain	Network	
Tom	Lovett	&	Jack	Griffin	 Veolia	SourceOne	/	Hudson	Yards	
Dan	Dobbs	and	Luis	Ortiz	 Anbaric	
Galen	Nelson	 Massachusetts	Clean	Energy	Council	
Travis	Sheehan	 Gridling	Global	
James	Mader	 Avangrid	
Karen	Morgan	 Dynamic	Energy	Networks	
Michael	DeSocio	 New	York	Independent	Service	Operator	
Mark	Feasel	 Schneider	Electric	
Brad	Swing	 City	of	Boston	
Manuel	Esquivel	 Boston	Planning	and	Development	Agency	
John	Moynihan	 Cogen	Power	Technologies	
Paul	Tyno	 Boston	Niagara	Medical	Campus	
Arunkumar	Vedhathiri		 National	Grid	–	New	Energy	Solutions	
Michael	P.	Razanousky	 NY	State	Energy	Research	&	Development	Authority	
Josh	Doolittle	and	Vishal	Patwari	 B2Q	Associates	
Heather	Takle	 2nd	Path	Energy	
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